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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL TO 
 
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 
The President’s Council on Bioethics 
1801 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Suite 700 
Washington, D.C. 20006 
May 10, 2005 
 
The President 
The White House 
Washington, D.C. 
 
Dear Mr. President: 
 
I am pleased to present to you Alternative Sources of Human 
Pluripotent Stem Cells, a White Paper of the President's Council 
on Bioethics.  
Since the publication of our report, Monitoring Stem Cell 
Research, in January of 2004, the Council has continued to ponder 
and discuss the ethical challenges posed by human embryonic 
stem cell research and the demands of scientists to develop new 
human embryonic stem cell lines. While they may well in the 
future prove to be of considerable scientific and therapeutic 
value, new human embryonic stem cell lines cannot at present be 
obtained without destroying human embryos. As a consequence, 
the worthy goals of increasing scientific knowledge and 
developing therapies for grave human illnesses come into 
conflict with the strongly held belief of many Americans that 
human life, from its earliest stages, deserves our protection and 
respect. 
Seeking to advance biomedical science while upholding 
ethical norms, the Council has taken a keen interest in recent 
suggestions that science itself might provide a way around this 
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ethical dilemma. Accordingly, we have been looking into ways 
of obtaining pluripotent, genetically stable, and long-lived 
human stem cells (the functional equivalent of human 
embryonic stem cells) that do not involve creating, destroying, or 
harming human embryos. We have found that there are, broadly 
speaking, four such possible approaches: stem cells might be 
obtainable from dead embryos; from living embryos, by non-
destructive biopsy; from bioengineered embryo-like artifacts; and 
from reprogrammed adult somatic cells. In this White Paper, we 
introduce each of these four approaches and offer a preliminary 
analysis of their strengths and weaknesses, ethical, scientific, and 
practical. 
While different members of the Council assess the merits of 
the four proposals differently, the Council shares the view that 
the group of proposals here discussed—and others like them 
that they may stimulate—deserve the nation’s careful and 
serious consideration. We offer this White Paper both to enrich 
and inform public discussion of the ethical dimensions of stem 
cell research and especially to encourage scientists to explore 
these and other possible ways to press forward with pluripotent 
stem cell research in ways that all Americans can wholeheart-
edly support. 
Mr. President, allow me to join my Council colleagues and 
our fine staff in thanking you for this opportunity to offer you 
and the American people our assistance in the critical efforts to 
promote a biomedical science that will simultaneously serve 
human needs and preserve human dignity. 
 
    Sincerely, 
     





THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS 
 
 
LEON R. KASS, M.D., PH.D., Chairman. 
Addie Clark Harding Professor, The College and the 
Committee on Social Thought, University of Chicago. Hertog 
Fellow, American Enterprise Institute. 
 
BENJAMIN S. CARSON, SR., M.D. 
Professor and Director of Pediatric Neurosurgery, Johns 
Hopkins Medical Institutions. 
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Medicine, Washington University, St. Louis. 
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Alternative Sources of Human Pluripotent Stem Cells is a White 
Paper of the President’s Council on Bioethics, which was created 
by President George W. Bush on November 28, 2001, by means 
of Executive Order 13237. 
 
The Council’s purpose is to advise the President on 
bioethical issues related to advances in biomedical science and 
technology. In connection with its advisory role, the mission of 
the Council includes the following functions: 
 
• To undertake fundamental inquiry into the human and 
moral significance of developments in biomedical and 
behavioral science and technology. 
 
• To explore specific ethical and policy questions related to 
these developments. 
 
• To provide a forum for a national discussion of bioethical 
issues. 
 
• To facilitate a greater understanding of bioethical issues. 
 
The President left the Council free to establish its own priorities 
among the many issues encompassed within its charter and to 
determine its own modes of proceeding. 
 
Stem cell research has been of interest to, and associated in 
the public mind with, this Council since its creation. Taking up 
the charge given to us by President Bush in his August 9, 2001, 
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speech on stem cell research, the Council has from its beginnings 
been monitoring developments in this fast-paced and exciting 
field of research. In January 2004, the Council published a report, 
Monitoring Stem Cell Research, which provided an overview of the 
law, ethics, and science of stem cell research. That report was 
intended to serve as a source of clear, intelligible, and useful 
information for both policymakers and the general public 
regarding the current state of this important research and of the 
debates that surround it. 
 
Much of the ethical controversy over stem cells derives from 
the fact that, until now, the only way to obtain human 
pluripotent stem cell lines has been to derive them from living 
human embryos by a process that necessarily destroys the 
embryos. If a way could be found to derive such stem cell lines 
without creating and destroying human embryos, a good deal of 
that ethical controversy would subside. 
 
The present White Paper may be regarded as a new 
contribution to the stem cell discussions. It reports on some 
recent developments that deserve public notice because of their 
potential for finding a morally uncontroversial means of 
obtaining pluripotent human stem cells. Over the past six 
months, the Council has been looking into specific scientific 
proposals for obtaining pluripotent, genetically stable, and long-
lived human stem cells by methods that would not involve 
destroying or endangering human embryos. In December 2004, 
the Council heard presentations of two such proposals, one by 
Drs. Donald Landry and Howard Zucker of the Columbia 
University College of Physicians and Surgeons, and the other by 
Dr. William Hurlbut of Stanford University (and a member of 
this Council). In March 2005, the Council discussed a staff 
working paper in which these two proposals, as well as two 






That staff working paper, extensively revised and improved 
in light of Council discussions and member comments, is what 
the Council is now issuing as a White Paper, Alternative Sources 
of Human Pluripotent Stem Cells. In its present form, the White 
Paper has also benefited from expert review by three prominent 
scientists (Andrew Fire of the Stanford University School of 
Medicine, Markus Grompe of the Oregon Health & Science 
University, and Janet Rossant of the Samuel Lunenfeld Research 
Institute in Toronto, Ontario), as well as consultation with 
scientists at the National Institutes of Health. 
 
The White Paper introduces the four proposals and begins an 
analysis of their strengths and weaknesses, ethical, scientific, and 
practical. Because the scientific and practical merits of these 
proposals are in large part empirical matters, not settled in 
advance by mere speculation, we give special weight to the 
ethical analysis. We also explore, in a preliminary way, whether 
these alternative avenues of deriving and using pluripotent stem 
cells are likely to be embraced by scientists or to become eligible 
for federal funding.  
 
It remains to be seen whether any of these proposals will 
succeed scientifically, and more discussion is surely required on 
some of the ethical issues we have identified. Nevertheless, 
having conducted this “preliminary hearing,” we believe that 
several of these possibilities have sufficient merit to commend 
them now to wider public attention and further scientific 
investigation. People of all moral and political persuasions 
should be pleased to learn that scientists and others are 
creatively seeking morally unproblematic and uncontroversial 
ways to advance this promising area of scientific research.  
 
In creating this Council, President Bush expressed his desire 
to see us 
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consider all of the medical and ethical ramifications of 
biomedical innovation. . . . This council will keep us 
apprised of new developments and give our nation a 
forum to continue to discuss and evaluate these 
important issues. As we go forward, I hope we will 
always be guided by both intellect and heart, by both our 
capabilities and our conscience. 
 
It has been our goal in the present White Paper, as in all of our 
work, to live up to these high hopes and noble aspirations. 
 
 
           LEON R. KASS, M.D. 






















 Human embryonic stem cells hold great interest 
because of their pluripotency—their capacity to give rise to 
the various specialized cells of the body—and because of 
their longevity—their ability to be propagated for many 
generations in laboratory culture without losing their 
pluripotency. Until now, these cells have been obtainable 
only from living human embryos [at the 100-to-200-cell 
(blastocyst) stage of development] by a process that 
necessarily destroys the embryos and that therefore makes 
this research ethically controversial. Over the past several 
years, the ethical controversy has been the subject of 
federal (and state) legislation and public policy and of 
ongoing public debate.*  
                                                 
* Since 1995, Congress has annually enacted legislation (the Dickey 
Amendment) that prohibits the use of federal funds for research in 
which human embryos are destroyed or harmed. In 2001, President 
George W. Bush instituted the current policy, which permits federal 
funding for research on those embryonic stem cell lines already in 
existence, but not for derivation or use of any new lines (the creation of 
which would require new embryo destruction). Vigorous debates 
continue about the ethics of embryonic stem cell research, as well as 
about the federal funding policy. For a synoptic view of these ethical 
and political discussions, including a history of the relevant public 
policy decisions, see Monitoring Stem Cell Research: A Report of the 
President’s Council on Bioethics (2004), especially chapters two and three. 
For the text of the Dickey Amendment, see endnote 10. 
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 The President’s Council on Bioethics is committed to 
the goals of advancing biomedical science and upholding 
ethical norms. Notwithstanding our sometimes sharp 
individual ethical differences, we have recognized that all 
parties to the debates about embryo research have 
something vital to defend, and not only for themselves but 
for all of us.1 As members of a national public bioethics 
body, we are also mindful of the need to understand and 
respect the strongly held ethical views of our fellow 
citizens, even when we do not share them. For these 
reasons, we must be receptive to any creative scientific or 
technical suggestions that might enable scientists to 
proceed with their research in ways that would not raise 
ethical questions or violate the ethical principles of many 
Americans. 
 
 Accordingly, in an effort to find ethically 
uncontroversial ways to advance human embryonic stem 
cell research, the Council has recently been looking into 
specific proposals for obtaining pluripotent, genetically 
stable, and long-lived human stem cells by methods that 
would meet the moral standard of not destroying or 
endangering human embryos in the process. This White 
Paper introduces these proposals and begins an analysis of 
their strengths and weaknesses, ethical, scientific, and 
practical. Because the scientific and practical merits of these 
proposals are in large part empirical matters, not settled in 
advance by mere speculation, we give special weight to the 
ethical analysis. We also explore, in a preliminary way, 
whether these alternative avenues of deriving and using 
pluripotent stem cells are likely to be embraced by 
scientists or to become eligible for federal funding. 
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 Conceptually, four broad approaches present 
themselves. The stem cells could be derived: (1) by 
extracting cells from embryos already dead; or (2) by non-
harmful biopsy of living embryos; or (3) by extracting cells 
from artificially created non-embryonic but embryo-like 
cellular systems (engineered to lack the essential elements 
of embryogenesis but still capable of some cell division and 
growth); or (4) by dedifferentiation of somatic cells back to 
pluripotency. In each of these four cases, the scientific 
standard by which success should be measured is only the 
desired functional capacity of the cells derived—stable 
pluripotency—and not their origin (embryos, adults, or 
artificial embryo-like clusters of cells). Should stem cells 
obtainable by one or another of these methods turn out to 
have exactly the same properties and capacities as 
embryonic stem cells (ESCs), their value for scientific 
research should be no different from that of standard ESCs.  
 
 Recently, more or less detailed examples of each of 
these four approaches have been proposed or discussed. 
 
 According to the first proposal, pluripotent human stem 
cells are to be derived from early IVF embryos (roughly 4-8 
cells) that have spontaneously died (as evidenced by the 
irreversible cessation of cell division) but some of whose 
blastomeres* appear normal and healthy. Crucial to this 
                                                 
* A “blastomere” (literally, a part of a “blast” or embryo) is a cell 
contained within an early embryo (up to two days after conception), 
which comprises a small number of such blastomeres. Thus a 4-celled 
embryo contains four blastomeres, and an 8-celled embryo contains 
eight blastomeres. Beyond the 8-cell stage, on the third day after 
conception, the early embryo turns into a compact sphere known as a 
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approach is (a) enunciating a concept of organismic death 
of an early embryo and (b) devising criteria that permit a 
determination that embryonic death has occurred. In 
addition, to satisfy the moral standard, only those once-
frozen embryos that are thawed and that die spontaneously 
during efforts to produce a child will be eligible for post-
mortem cell extraction. This proposal was presented at the 
Council’s December 3, 2004, meeting by Drs. Donald 
Landry and Howard Zucker of the Columbia University 
College of Physicians and Surgeons. 
 
 According to the second proposal, pluripotent stem cells 
are to be derived from blastomeres obtained by biopsy of 
an early human embryo. Crucial to this approach is finding 
a stage of early embryonic development at which (a) the 
removal of one or a few cells by biopsy can be carried out 
without harming the embryo, while (b) the cell or cells 
removed from the embryo are usable as a source of 
pluripotent stem cells. 
 
 The third approach comprises a variety of proposals for 
engineering “biological artifacts” possessing some of the 
developmental capacities of natural embryogenesis (but 
lacking the organismal character of human embryos) and 
containing cells from which pluripotent stem cell lines can 
                                                                                                           
morula; and on the fifth day after conception, the morula becomes a 
blastocyst (100-200 cells), a hollow ball of cells surrounding an inner 
cell mass. The cells of an embryo at the morula or blastocyst stage, 
being more differentiated than those of a 4-8-cell embryo, will not be 
referred to here as blastomeres, although some authors use the term to 
describe any cells of an embryo before it cavitates to become a 
blastocyst. 
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be derived. Crucial to this approach is demonstrating both 
(a) that the developing entity is truly not a human embryo 
and (b) that the cells derived from it are in fact normal 
human pluripotent cells. In addition, one must show that 
creating such biological artifacts does not itself introduce 
other ethical problems. One such proposal (“Altered 
Nuclear Transfer”) was presented at the Council’s 
December 3, 2004, meeting by Council Member Dr. William 
Hurlbut. 
 
 The fourth proposal involves reprogramming human 
somatic cells, perhaps with the aid of special cytoplasmic 
factors obtained from oocytes (or from pluripotent 
embryonic stem cells), so as to “dedifferentiate” them back 
into pluripotent stem cells. Crucial to this approach is 
discovering a way to reverse cell differentiation all the way 
to pluripotency, but not (as in cloning) even further back to 
totipotency.* 
 
 This White Paper describes each of these proposals and 
examines them with a view to the following three 
questions: 
 
 Ethical Question: Is it ethically sound? That is, would the 
proposed method overcome the ethical objections that have 
been raised against current methods of deriving embryonic 
                                                 
* A totipotent cell (for example, the fertilized egg or zygote) is one that 
can give rise to the entire organism, including the extra-embryonic 
membranes; a pluripotent cell (for example, an embryonic stem cell) is 
one that can give rise to many if not all the different cell types of the 
human body, but not to the whole organism as a living integrated 
entity. 
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stem cells that entail the destruction of human embryos? 
And does the proposed method raise new ethical 
difficulties of its own that make it problematic, worrisome, 
or even unacceptable?* 
 
 Feasibility Question: Is it scientifically sound? That is, 
might it reliably produce stable, pluripotent stem cell lines 
of sufficient quality for biomedical research and, in due 
course, for clinical trials in human beings? 
 
 Practical Question: From the perspective of both public policy 
and research practice, is this proposal “realistic”? That is, are 
there good reasons for believing that, if it is found to be 
scientifically feasible, it might be adoptable—by scientists 
as useful, by policy makers as legally eligible for federal 
                                                 
* The discussions in this paper take for granted the existing practices of 
assisted reproduction, including in vitro fertilization, the storage of 
frozen embryos for later reproductive use, and preimplantation genetic 
screening and diagnosis (PGD) of in vitro embryos prior to their 
transfer to initiate a pregnancy. These practices raise ethical issues of 
their own, and some people (including some Council members) object 
to them altogether. Although we recognize that there are many, and 
often deep, questions connected with the growing control over all 
aspects of human procreation, we will (for the most part) not be 
analyzing or arguing those questions here. We recommend, however, 
that they not be lost sight of, especially as the political acceptability of 
some of the proposals reviewed here will be influenced by where 
people stand on those larger questions. And clearly, some people will 
evaluate the proposals here under review not solely in themselves, but 
also by assessing their relationship to and potential effect on the way 
assisted reproduction is practiced, and by judging whether the 
proposed uses of dead embryos, blastomere biopsy, egg harvesting, 
and altered nuclear transfer create incentives for engaging in practices 
they deem misguided, unethical, or unwise. 
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support, and by the people and their elected officials as 
morally worthy of federal support? (In considering these 
questions, as we will in each case below, we are not to be 
understood either (a) to be making predictions about what 
scientists will in fact believe or (b) to be offering 
recommendations for what policy makers should in fact do. 
The first must await the arrival of relevant options; the 
second must depend on an assessment of the ethical claims 
and on prudential judgments to be made in specific 
circumstances that we cannot predict. Still, practical people 
will want to know whether any of this could become useful 
scientific practice or wise public policy, and we are obliged 
to discuss some aspects of these questions.)* 
 
                                                 
* Even if one or more or of these alternative sources of pluripotent stem 
cells were to meet all these requirements (ethical soundness, scientific 
feasibility, eligibility for federal funding, and broad acceptability to 
scientists), there would still remain the question of whether the cost of 
pursuing such alternatives—the necessary investment of scientific 
energy and resources, and the possible diversion of such energy and 
resources from other promising avenues of research—would outweigh 
the benefits. This White Paper does not pretend to answer that serious 
question, for it cannot be answered a priori, in advance of knowing 
empirically those costs and benefits. Moreover, how any person 
answers that question will depend on how strongly he or she cares 
about the additional “benefits” and “costs” of requiring scientific 
research to respect certain moral boundaries and strongly held moral 
qualms, in this case about protecting the moral worth of embryonic 
human life. 
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I. Pluripotent Stem Cells Derived from Organismically 
Dead Embryos (Landry-Zucker Proposal2) 
 
 This proposal begins by making a close analogy with 
the use of human cadavers for biomedical research or as 
sources of organs. Today, we find morally and socially 
acceptable the removal (with consent) of vital organs from 
no-longer-living developed human beings once they have 
been declared dead.3 Therefore, Landry and Zucker 
suggest, we should also find morally and socially 
acceptable the removal (with consent) of materials for stem 
cell derivation from no-longer-living undeveloped human 
beings (human embryos) once they have been declared 
dead. Applying the traditional concept of death—the 
irreversible loss of the integrated functioning of an 
organism as a whole—to the earliest stages of human life, 
Landry and Zucker propose a concept of organismic death for 
the early-stage human embryo: the irreversible loss of the 
capacity for “continued and integrated cellular division, 
growth and differentiation.”* As the criterion for determining 
organismic death of an embryo produced by in vitro 
fertilization (IVF), they propose the “irreversible cessation 
of cell division in the embryo observed in vitro.”  
 
 After fertilization in vitro, a high percentage of human 
embryos that reach the 4- or 8-cell stage undergo 
                                                 
* From reference 2: “We propose that the [minimal] defining capacity of 
a 4- or 8-cell human embryo is continued and integrated cellular 
division, growth and differentiation. We further propose that an 
embryo that has irreversibly lost this capacity, even as its individual 
cells are alive, is properly considered organismically dead.” 
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spontaneous “cleavage arrest”—that is, their cells simply 
stop dividing. The vast majority of these arrested embryos 
do not resume cell division, never form blastocysts, and are 
incapable of successfully implanting in the uterus. In most 
cases, spontaneous cleavage arrest is associated with 
chromosomal abnormalities in the cells of the developing 
embryos. Yet some of the arrested embryos turn out to be 
“mosaic”—that is, some of their cells exhibit chromosomal 
abnormalities, while others appear to be (chromosomally, 
at least) normal blastomeres. It is these normal-appearing 
blastomeres in cleavage-arrested, mosaic embryos that may 
turn out to be a source of embryonic stem cells. Landry and 
Zucker propose that those embryos that have undergone 
irreversible cleavage arrest should be declared 
organismically dead and hence suitable (with proper 
consent) for harvesting of blastomeres for stem cell 
derivation.*  
 
To identify when organismic death occurs in IVF 
embryos, Landry and Zucker propose a two-part research 
strategy. First, they propose a “natural history” study to 
determine just when a non-flourishing embryo in vitro 
ceases cell division irreversibly: 
 
Previously frozen early embryos that have failed to 
divide within 24 hours of thawing and are [therefore] 
                                                 
* The cells of an organismically dead embryo have stopped dividing 
altogether; their cleavage arrest is considered irreversible in the sense 
that the cells show no tendency to resume dividing while remaining part 
of the dead embryo. Of course, the goal of the Landry-Zucker proposal is 
to retrieve from these dead embryos some cells that can be induced to 
resume dividing under conditions conducive to stem cell derivation.  
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no longer wanted [because they are no longer fit] for 
their original reproductive purpose are observed 
every few hours for several additional 24-hour 
periods.* After observing several hundred embryos, 
the time beyond which no arrested embryo resumes 
division can be determined. One can reasonably 
conclude that embryos that have not divided by this 
period will not divide at any later time, i.e., they are 
organismically dead. 
 
Second, they propose an experimental study to attempt 
to identify physical or biochemical cellular markers that 
correlate with the arrest of cell division and in whose 
presence any arrested embryo could be declared dead: 
 
[IVF] Embryos declared [organismically] dead could 
then be characterized for secreted or cell surface 
markers or spectroscopic signatures that correlate 
with the arrest of cell division. These markers and 
signatures could then be tested for their predictive 
value. In this manner the criteria for determining the 
death of a human embryo could be refined. 
                                                 
* It might be asked why Landry and Zucker confine their attention to 
embryos that have been frozen and then thawed, as opposed to “fresh” 
never-frozen embryos. The answer is that, in current IVF practice, 
healthy-looking embryos that have reached the 4- or 8-cell stage but are 
not selected for transfer to the uterus are generally frozen for possible 
future transfer attempts. To delay freezing such embryos while looking 
for signs of cleavage arrest would, arguably, subject the embryos to 
additional risk, contrary to the intention of the proposal. In contrast, 
the embryos of interest to Landry and Zucker—frozen embryos that are 
thawed out but never resume cell division—are not, in current IVF 
practice, either transferred to the uterus or frozen a second time. 
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According to Landry and Zucker, determining criteria 
of organismic death through the natural history study 
would be sufficient to commence efforts to derive human 
embryonic stem cells from dead embryos; the subsequent 
experimental study could facilitate this effort by rendering 




A. Is It Ethically Sound? 
 
The Landry-Zucker proposal is based on an attractively 
simple ethical idea: it should be permissible to harvest cells 
from embryos that have died (provided of course that their 
deaths have not been caused or hastened for such 
purposes). Yet the final ethical assessment of this proposal 
will depend very much on exactly how it is implemented, 
within the practices and protocols of IVF. Several other 
pertinent questions have been raised as well. 
 
1. Can we be certain that the IVF embryos used in this proposal 
are really dead?  
 
This challenge unites two separate concerns, one about 
knowing whether the criteria for death have been met in 
any particular case, the other about the criteria themselves. 
 
Landry and Zucker propose to harvest cells from 4- or 
8-cell thawed human embryos that have irreversibly ceased 
to divide. Since the harvested cells are to serve as a source 
of stem cells, it is not feasible to wait for the death and 
dissolution of each and every cell before declaring the 
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embryo dead and eligible for use in research. To be useful 
for the project, the arrested embryos must contain at least 
some viable cells that retain normal developmental 
potential. Some of these cells, for example, might resume 
dividing if extracted and placed in the proper milieu. How, 
then, can we be sure that such an embryo is really dead? 
More generally, can we confidently declare that an embryo 
is dead just because all of its cells have stopped dividing? 
What exactly do we mean by the “organismic death” of an 
embryo? 
 
It must be acknowledged that the concept of organismic 
death—the death of an organism as a whole—has not been 
commonly applied to an embryo, that is, to any largely 
undifferentiated organism so close to the beginning of its 
life. Moreover, even granting the applicability of the 
concept, identifying the criteria for determining organismic 
death for an embryo is, at least for now, more difficult than 
it is for an adult, owing to the absence of any integrating 
vital organs. Unlike a person at the end of life, an embryo 
has no identifiable controlling organ—no brain to be 
considered “brain dead,” no heart that has ceased to beat 
and circulate the blood. For now, our judgment that an 
embryo has lost “integrated function as an organism” must 
be based simply on the observed absence of coordinated 
cell division. It is partly for that reason that Landry and 
Zucker hope that studies might reveal biochemical markers 
that would put the phenomenological finding of irreversible 
cleavage arrest on a sounder, “more objective” footing. 
 
Yet despite these uncertainties, as Landry and Zucker 
suggest, the life of an embryo (as of any organism) is more 
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than just the sum of the lives of its constituent cells; and the 
death of an embryonic organism-as-a-whole is not the same 
thing as the death of its constituent cells. For the embryo to 
develop as an integrated organism, there must be an 
integrated set of internal signals directing the 
differentiation, development, and growth of the 
multicellular organism as a whole. The breakdown or 
absence of that set of signals amounts to the death of the 
developing embryo, manifested most clearly in the 
irreversible cessation of coordinated, organized cell 
division. Just as a person can be declared dead even while 
some of his organs and cells continue for a time to function 
and grow, so an embryo can undergo organismic death 
even while some of its individual cells may remain alive as 
cells, capable of further division if isolated and placed in a 
suitable environment.  
 
Landry and Zucker point to studies showing that a 
substantial proportion of IVF embryos, after thawing, never 
exhibit any further cell division, even though some of their 
blastomeres appear otherwise normal. It is these embryos, 
they suggest, that can be unambiguously declared 
“organismically dead,” and whose normal-looking 
blastomeres may be suitable candidates for embryonic stem 
cell derivation.* 
                                                 
* Yet here, too, a caution must be observed. As discussed elsewhere in 
this paper (see section 2 on p. 29, as well as endnote 18), we do not 
know precisely when, in embryonic development, human blastomeres 
cease to be totipotent, that is, individually capable of growing into a 
complete human being. To avoid the possibility that the cells extracted 
from a dead embryo might be totipotent, it would perhaps be advisable 
to carry out the Landry-Zucker proposal using somewhat older 
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2. Will not this proposal put embryos at additional risk?  
 
The Landry-Zucker proposal involves scrutinizing 
thawed IVF embryos for signs of death and extracting cells 
from organismically dead embryos. A reasonable concern 
is that this procedure should not expose any living human 
embryos to risks they would not ordinarily encounter in 
the practice of assisted reproduction. Sharing this concern, 
Landry and Zucker place special strictures on which 
embryos are to be used, both in natural history studies to 
determine the criteria of death and in subsequent stem cell 
derivations. The only embryos that would be considered 
for use would be those (1) that were originally created with 
reproductive intent, (2) that were thought healthy enough 
to be kept alive in cryostorage for possible second or third 
child-producing attempts, and (3) that, after thawing, 
turned out, alas, to be dead. The natural history research 
proposed by Landry and Zucker would simply continue to 
watch those embryos that were not making any 
developmental progress, in order to determine more 
precisely exactly when they were irreversibly incapable of 
further development. No living embryo would be subject 
to manipulative intervention or to any procedure that 
increased its exposure to harm. No new or extra embryos 
would be created for such research, and no embryo would 
be deliberately killed or otherwise exposed to harm. This 
“death watch” study proposed by Landry and Zucker 
seeks only to discover which embryos are already dead, not 
to induce weak or doomed embryos to die.  
                                                                                                           
cleavage-arrested embryos (containing 8 cells or more) rather than 
embryos as early as the 4-cell stage. 
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3. Changing practices and incentives for IVF practitioners.  
 
The proposed experiments to determine the natural 
history of organismic death in IVF embryos should be done 
in a way that does not compromise the safety of, or make 
more physically or psychologically onerous, current IVF 
clinical procedures. They also should not change incentives 
and practices regarding embryo production. Some people 
worry that approving the use of dead embryos for stem cell 
derivation will lead to the creation of even more embryos 
than are now produced in excess of reproductive need, 
precisely so that some could be allowed to die for the sake 
of getting stem cells from them. Yet it is important to note 
that, under the Landry-Zucker proposal, embryos that 
divide normally upon thawing, but are allowed to die by a 
human decision (not to transfer them into a woman’s 
uterus), would not be eligible for donation. Precisely in 
order to avoid participation or complicity in the death of 
any embryos, their proposal restricts use to only those 
embryos that fail altogether to divide upon thawing and 
that have thus died “on their own.” For now, no change of 
practice or incentives would be likely or necessary, since 
many embryos are thawed for a second reproductive trial 
and, of these, a sizeable fraction (in some cases, close to one 
half) fail to develop.4 Still, going forward it will be 
important to provide oversight and assurance that the 
desire for material useful for the natural history study or 
for stem cell derivation does not increase either the number 
of frozen embryos that are thawed in an attempt to 
produce a second pregnancy or the number created for 
reproductive purposes in the first place. It would be an 
ethically dubious innovation if the implementation of the 
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Landry-Zucker proposal were to change the incentives or 
the practices of IVF embryo creation or storage in these 
ways.* 
 
4. Issues for informed consent.  
 
Additional discussions with the embryo-producing, 
child-seeking patients that explain (and seek consent for) 
the proposed experiment and use will be required. And a 
fitting informed-consent form will have to be developed 
and approved. While this is well within the scope of 
present practice, it will necessarily involve discussion of 
the likely death of some embryos created by the IVF 
procedure. Many clinicians shy away from using the word 
“death” to describe what happens to the embryos that do 
not develop in vitro, fearful that such a designation would 
imply that those embryos were in fact alive and that they 
might therefore be held at fault for their resulting deaths. 
Nevertheless, only a frank discussion of these facts could 
produce meaningful consent from the patients. Discussion 
and suitably documented agreements will also be needed 
to address additional questions, including who owns the 
commercial rights to any human pluripotent stem cell line 
created by this research. 
 
                                                 
* To turn this morally scrupulous proposal into morally scrupulous 
practice would seem to require protocols and enforceable regulations 
that would provide very strict monitoring and oversight. The political 
acceptability of the Landry-Zucker proposal might hinge on having a 
regulatory system in place so that there would be some way to track 
IVF embryos (as the Canadians do), thus ensuring that abuses do not 
creep in.  
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5. For ethical purposes, is there a sufficiently strong analogy 
between harvesting cells from dead embryos and harvesting 
organs or removing tissues from dead persons?  
 
Landry and Zucker base the ethical justification of their 
proposal on the analogy with end-of-life organ donation. 
Yet the analogy is not altogether exact: unlike the physician 
caring for a dying patient, the IVF clinician does not in 
general treat the death of an embryo as a grave matter. 
Certain standard IVF procedures, including superovulation 
and cryopreservation of excess embryos, knowingly 
increase the likelihood that many individual embryos will 
die or be discarded;5 but this is not generally considered a 
reason to forgo production and freezing of “extra” 
embryos. Some observers, troubled by these aspects of the 
clinical context in which this proposal would be carried out 
and disinclined to benefit by complicity in these practices, 
do not find the analogy with organ donation sufficiently 
compelling to justify the extraction of cells from dead IVF 
embryos, especially when the intended use of the extracted 
cells is scientific research rather than the immediate use of 
organs to save dying patients. 
 
Nonetheless, an exact analogy with organ donation is 
not required to show that what Landry and Zucker are 
proposing is what they claim it to be: a morally preferable 
alternative to the intentional destruction of embryos. Death 
comes spontaneously to many embryos, both in vivo and in 
vitro, and it is difficult to see how dissecting spontaneously 
dead embryos can be said to harm them. And if the 
principle “Once dead, then usable”—of course, with 
informed consent and showing respect for the corpse—
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works ethically for removing transplantable organs or 
research materials from dead adult human beings, it 
should work equally well for dead human embryos 
(provided, again, that the embryos are indeed dead and 
that their prospective users have not deliberately killed 
them or neglected them so that they would die). In the end, 
whether this proposal proves to be morally acceptable and 
practically wise remains to be seen.  
 
 
B. Is It Scientifically Sound? 
 
The Landry-Zucker proposal has yet to be tested, 
though it is technically possible to begin testing it 
immediately, not only in animals but also in humans. Three 
basic questions need to be answered: Can objective markers 
of organismic death be found? Can pluripotent stem cells 
be derived from dead embryos? If so, will they be 
chromosomally (and otherwise) normal?  
 
1. Can one find objective markers for organismic death?  
 
It seems likely that the natural history study will 
identify “duration without cleavage” as one objective 
marker of embryonic organismic death, but the exact 
criterion has yet to be established.* Whether additional 
biochemical markers can be identified is not yet known, 
but, according to Landry and Zucker, their discovery is not 
                                                 
* “Failure to cleave 24 hours after thawing” may not prove to be a 
sufficient criterion for organismic death, since, in the study by Laverge, 
et al. [see endnote 4], roughly 10% of embryos meeting that criterion 
showed some sign of further cleavage by 48 hours after thawing.  
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essential for the immediate implementation of the 
proposal. Ultimately, the issue of markers is largely an 
empirical question: one will not know the answer until the 
effort to find them is made.  
 
2. Can one in fact get usable pluripotent stem cells from dead 
embryos?  
 
Once embryos in vitro have been determined to be 
organismically dead, a basic scientific question, still 
unanswered, is whether pluripotent stem cells can then be 
derived, starting from any remaining blastomeres. There is 
reason to believe that some cells in arrested embryos may 
retain their developmental potential, which can be 
reactivated by transferring them to the appropriate milieu; 
but the evidence is very preliminary.6 In addition, recent 
work by Dr. Nicolai Strelchenko and colleagues (working 
at Chicago’s Reproductive Genetics Institute headed by Dr. 
Yury Verlinsky) has described the production of human 
pluripotent stem cells derived by culturing blastomeres 
removed from morula-stage (8-24-cell) human embryos.*7 
The next step would be to show that stem cells can be 
derived from single blastomeres extracted from 8-cell 
embryos.† It would then have to be shown that similar 
                                                 
* Note that most embryologists reserve the term “morula” for embryos 
of more than 8 cells. See footnote starting on page three above. 
† Deriving stem cells from isolated single blastomeres may prove 
significantly more challenging than deriving them from disaggregated 
blastocysts or morulae; in human ESC derivations achieved so far, 
groups of cells have been cultured together, and it is not known 
whether the presence of other cells is necessary for the derivation of 
embryonic stem cells from a single blastomere. 
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results can be obtained using blastomeres extracted from 
organismically dead IVF embryos.  
 
3. Will the stem cells derived from dead embryos be normal and 
healthy?  
 
Questions have been raised regarding whether 
pluripotent stem cell lines isolated from organismically 
dead IVF embryos would be abnormal, and in particular, 
aneuploid (that is, having more or fewer than the normal 
number of chromosomes).8 The answer cannot be given in 
advance, but there are reliable methods for determining it 
in every case. Each isolated pluripotent cell line would be 
grown in vitro, so that a detailed study could subsequently 
be done on the chromosome complement of each cell line. 
Such testing would identify those pluripotent stem cell 
lines with a normal chromosome complement; repeated 
karyotype testing throughout the period of laboratory 
culture and storage could confirm that the chromosome 
complement remains normal. Moreover, while pluripotent 
stem cell lines with a normal chromosome complement 
would have the broadest potential therapeutic 
applicability, pluripotent stem cell lines with specific 
abnormal chromosome complements (for example, three 
copies of chromosome 21, as is observed in people with 
Down syndrome) could be useful in basic studies of how 
(in this example) the presence of the extra chromosome 
affects differentiation processes that subsequently lead to a 




A WHITE PAPER OF 





C. Is It “Realistic”? 
 
Two kinds of practical questions have been raised: First, 
will scientists want to work with these cells? And, second, 
will the research be supportable by federal funding, under 
the legislative and administrative restrictions now in place?  
 
1. Scientific acceptance.  
 
Scientists understandably want to work only with the 
best materials. Why, it is asked, would they settle for cells 
derived from dead embryos, especially since embryos that 
die early are generally abnormal, either chromosomally or 
in other ways?* And why should they bother trying to 
develop these cells lines, when they can use existing ESC 
lines or derive new ones at will from living IVF (“spare” or 
newly created) embryos? One answer is that they would 
welcome such cell lines if research using them were eligible 
for federal funding. But a better answer, and on the main 
question, is this: there is simply no way to know in advance 
whether cells derivable from dead embryos are in fact in 
any way inferior to cells derivable from still living 
blastocysts. One must do the experiment and see. 
                                                 
* Council Member Janet Rowley has suggested that it would be strange, 
while allowing large numbers of unwanted but otherwise normal and 
viable IVF embryos to die, to ask scientists to make strenuous efforts to 
rescue cells, potentially normal but potentially abnormal, only from 
those thawed embryos that have spontaneously stopped dividing. 
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2. Eligibility for federal funding.  
 
The Landry-Zucker proposal aims to provide a basis for 
future attempted isolations of pluripotent human stem cells 
by a procedure in which no embryos are killed for the 
purposes of research. Only embryos that are found to have 
died in the context of standard IVF clinical procedures 
would be used in attempts to produce the stem cells. Such 
experiments would ordinarily be considered human tissue 
research and require local IRB approval.  After that, most 
states would permit the research.9 It is somewhat more 
difficult to determine whether experiments to evaluate and 
implement the Landry-Zucker proposal would be eligible 
for federal funding under current law and policy. Two 
federal policies are particularly relevant: the Dickey 
Amendment10 and President Bush’s embryonic stem cell 
policy statement of August 9, 2001.11 The purpose of the 
Dickey Amendment is to deny federal funds for any 
experiment in which living human embryos are killed or 
harmed, while the intent of the President’s policy is to 
promote embryonic stem cell research without sanctioning 
or encouraging future destruction of human embryos*; both 
policies will have to be re-examined in the context of 
organismically dead IVF embryos. Assuming Landry-
Zucker criteria for embryonic death are established and 
                                                 
* The President’s August 9, 2001, policy (see endnote 11), which offers 
federal funding for research on embryonic stem cell lines only if those 
lines were derived before the date of the policy, is intended “to allow 
us to explore the promise and potential of stem cell research without 
crossing a fundamental moral line, by providing taxpayer funding that 
would sanction or encourage further destruction of human embryos 
that have at least the potential for life.” 
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clinically met, it would appear that federal funding for the 
further manipulation of such dead embryos would not 
violate either the letter or the spirit of the Dickey 
Amendment.* It is less clear whether the same could be said 
of the natural history studies to determine the precise 
criteria for embryonic organismic death, especially because 
federal funding has never been available for IVF research 
or practice or any treatment whatsoever of ex vivo 
embryos.† Nevertheless, a strong argument can be made 
that the mere observation of embryos that had 
spontaneously ceased to divide hardly constitutes doing 
them harm or causing their death. Whether the President’s 
policy and budget for federal funding of stem cell research 
would—or should—be expanded to support either 
research to derive stem cells from dead embryos or 
research on stem cell lines already derived from dead 
embryos with private support is a question whose answer 
will depend not only on the issue of legal eligibility but 
also on the assessment of other ethical, scientific, and 
prudential considerations of the sort we have just 
discussed. 
                                                 
* The use of federal funds for the derivation of stem cells from doomed 
but still-living embryos (the so-called “spare” embryos, unwanted for 
transfer in efforts to produce a child) violates the letter of the Dickey 
Amendment; the use of federal funds for research on embryonic stem 
cells derived by someone else’s prior destruction of a living embryo 
violates the spirit of the Dickey Amendment. Deriving stem cells only 
from already dead embryos seems not to commit either of these 
violations. 
† The Dickey Amendment has been enacted with the support of many 
members of Congress who are unwilling to “take for granted” the 
practices mentioned in the footnote on page six, including freezing of 
embryos or even IVF itself. 
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II. Pluripotent Stem Cells via Blastomere Extraction from 
Living Embryos 
 
Pluripotent stem cell lines could, in theory, be derived 
starting from small numbers of cells (“blastomeres”) 
removed from living human embryos. Is there a stage of 
early human embryonic development at which cells, 
capable of developing in vitro into pluripotent stem cells, 
can be extracted without harming the embryo’s prospects 
for developing into a live-born child?* 
 
Blastomere extraction from living IVF embryos is 
currently performed to conduct what is called 
“preimplantation genetic diagnosis” (PGD). PGD is a 
procedure increasingly being used in conjunction with 
assisted reproductive technologies to test IVF embryos for 
genetic and chromosomal abnormalities prior to uterine 
transfer for beginning a pregnancy. PGD generally involves 
removal of a blastomere or two from living 6-8-cell 
embryos, and subsequent genetic tests on the removed 
blastomeres. Following the genetic screening, the desired 
embryos, from which one or two blastomeres have been 
removed, are then transferred to women to initiate 
pregnancy. Although estimates vary widely, one recent 
report suggested that more than 1,000 babies had been born 
                                                 
* At present, embryonic stem cells are typically derived by extracting 
cells from the inner cell mass of the embryo at the blastocyst (roughly 
100-cell) stage; this entails the destruction of the trophectoderm (that is, 
the outer ring of cells in the spherical blastocyst structure, the 
precursor of the fetal contribution to the placenta) and the death of the 
embryo. 
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worldwide following PGD.12 Thus, apparently normal 
children have been born following removal of one or two 
blastomeres from the 6-8-cell embryo. However, long-term 
studies to determine whether this procedure produces 
subtle or later-developing injury in children born following 
PGD have been recommended13 and are sorely needed.  
 
As indicated above, Dr. Nicolai Strelchenko and his 
colleagues have shown that embryonic stem cells can be 
derived from human embryos containing 8-24 cells (see 
reference 7). In their method, all the cells of the embryo are 
disaggregated and cultured on feeder cells (and the embryo 
is killed in the process). It may be some time before stem 
cell lines can be reliably derived from single cells extracted 
from early embryos, and in ways that do no harm to the 
embryo thus biopsied. But the initial success of the 
Verlinsky group’s efforts at least raises the future 
possibility that pluripotent stem cells could be derived 
from single blastomeres removed from early human 
embryos without apparently harming them. *  
 
 
A. Is It Ethically Sound? 
 
1. Harm to the embryo?  
 
With the Landry-Zucker proposal, the major ethical 
issue concerned the question of whether the embryos 
would in fact be truly dead. Here, the major ethical issue 
                                                 
* A similar idea was proposed by Representative Roscoe Bartlett of 
Maryland as far back as 2001. 
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concerns the question of possible harm (and perhaps also 
benefit) to the still-living embryo whose cells are removed. 
Removal of blastomeres from developing IVF embryos in 
vitro is currently done primarily in the context of avoiding 
pregnancies at risk for genetic disease. Toward that end, 
the PGD techniques are used to test a group of embryos 
with a view to identifying those embryos that can be 
transferred to the woman without carrying known markers 
for genetic disease. (The embryos that do carry the 
abnormal genes are discarded.) Strictly speaking, embryo 
biopsy as currently practiced in PGD cannot be said to be 
undertaken for any future child’s benefit, since the 
procedure does not directly help those embryos that are 
ultimately implanted. Also, the genetically healthy 
embryos that are transferred to initiate a pregnancy will 
have been subjected to the as-yet-unknown risks of the 
blastomere biopsy procedure. For many individuals and 
couples, the known short-term and potential long-term 
risks of the PGD technique are thought to be more than 
balanced by the desire of the couple to have their own 
biological child free from a specific genetic disease. Others 
believe this practice is unethical, since it involves 
discriminating against genetically disabled embryos and 
ultimately discarding them. There also remains substantial 
debate about the ethical propriety of using PGD in two 
specific cases: (1) to identify embryos that would give rise 
to children who could serve as compatible bone marrow 
donors for sick siblings,14 and (2) to determine the sex of 
the embryos in order to be sure that only embryos of the 
desired gender were transferred.15 
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How would the ethical analysis change if living embryo 
blastomere extraction were to be performed not for PGD 
but for stem-cell derivation? Assuming that single 
blastomeres extracted from early embryos could in fact be 
used to derive pluripotent human stem cells, would this 
procedure pass ethical scrutiny? Since the removal of a cell 
or two from the embryo is not (usually) fatal, the 
individual embryo that is biopsied is not killed. However, 
since the blastomere extraction is not being performed for 
the good of the embryo, it might be hard to justify the 
procedure ethically. As Dr. Gerald Schatten told the 
Council in December 2002, “Embryo biopsy is a 
complicated technique, and it’s a very expensive technique, 
and it’s not clear that it is completely innocuous. So you 
would not go into embryo biopsy unless there were 
compelling reasons for actually going through all of the 
costs and expense and heroics of ART [assisted 
reproductive technologies].”16 And even when prospective 
parents do elect to use ART, subjecting otherwise healthy 
embryos to biopsy procedures in order to derive stem cells 
seems ethically troubling. Indeed, even if the biopsied 
embryo and the resulting child were not physically 
harmed, a strong line of moral argument might still lead 
one to object on the grounds that the embryo is being 
treated merely as a means to another’s ends. For there are 
more ways to do injustice to another human being than by 
actions that do discernable or manifest harm. Using human 
beings for purposes of no benefit to them and without their 
knowing consent is one such injustice, even if doing so 
results in no evident or eventual harm to body or psyche. 
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Such worries or objections might be moderated should 
the blastomere removal be undertaken, at least in part, for 
the possible benefit of the future child. As noted earlier, in 
embryo biopsy for PGD, sometimes two blastomeres are 
removed. This raises the futuristic possibility that one cell 
could be used for genetic diagnosis, while the other cell is 
used to derive a line of stem cells genetically autologous to 
the embryo and the child it becomes. Looking still farther 
ahead, patients using IVF without concern for genetic 
disease (and hence not interested in ordinary PGD) might 
nonetheless consider blastomere removal solely for the 
purpose of deriving immunologically compatible stem cells 
for their future child. Some might consider such a practice 
ethically justified on the grounds that the child born after 
uterine transfer of the embryo might later derive medical 
benefit from the existence of a genetically matched line of 
pluripotent stem cells, stored in case he needs it for future 
disease therapy. Others, however, doubt the wisdom of 
exposing the prospective child (while an embryo) to a 
hazardous procedure merely for the sake of some 
hypothetical future benefit, or of encouraging parents to 
practice embryo biopsy simply or mainly as a source of 
“personalized” stem cells should their future child 
someday have need of them.17 Besides, genetically matched 
stem cells can be more effectively derived using the 
newborn’s umbilical cord blood (a well-established 
procedure), though it is unclear whether the stem cells 
isolatable from cord blood will have all the same capacities 
as embryonic stem cells. 
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2. Are the removed blastomeres not themselves the equivalent of 
embryos or capable of developing into them?  
 
Another possible source of ethical concern has to do 
with the totipotency of early-stage human blastomeres in 
vivo.18 After the first cleavage of the fertilized human egg 
in vivo, both resulting blastomeres are capable of forming a 
complete embryo that grows into a child.* It is not certain at 
what point in embryonic development in vitro (as in IVF) 
such totipotency of the blastomeres disappears; it may be 
that, by the 8-cell stage, sufficient differentiation has taken 
place that individual human blastomeres are no longer 
individually totipotent without aggregating them or 
combining them with other early embryos. Clearly, 
however, if the blastomere removed for biopsy has the 
potential to develop into an embryo and a child on its own, 
some would find destruction of that blastomere ethically 
objectionable. And, in any case, little would have been 
gained ethically if the goal of the entire enterprise was a 
non-controversial procedure for deriving stem cells that 
did so while avoiding destruction of living embryos.  
                                                 
* Identical twinning can apparently take place during at least two 
stages of the in vivo development process: Spontaneous separation of 
the blastomeres at the two-cell stage leads to the formation of twins 
with two separate placentas (about 1/3 of cases); while embryo splitting 
at the blastocyst stage leads to the formation of identical twins that 
share the same placenta (about 2/3 of cases). 
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3. May one perform non-harmful blastomere extraction on 
embryos that are NOT going to become children? 
 
If embryo biopsy proves to be a usable source of 
pluripotent stem cells, some might argue that it would be 
ethically permissible to carry out such a procedure—not 
fatal and perhaps not harmful at all—not only on embryos 
that were soon to be transferred to a woman, but also on 
IVF “spare” embryos that are not ultimately selected for 
uterine transfer. Indeed, because of the still unknown risk 
of harm from blastomere removal to the child subsequently 
emerging from a biopsied embryo, some have suggested 
that the biopsy procedure can be ethically done only on an 
embryo that is definitely not going to become a child. 
Others, however, consider any proposed utilitarian 
treatment of such embryos to be morally unacceptable, 
since it necessarily classifies “spare” (and still living) 
embryos as ethically available for research uses.  
 
4. Can the research necessary to test this proposal be conducted 
in an ethically acceptable manner?  
 
Learning how to implement this proposal—even for the 
variation that would only seek stem cells that might 
eventually benefit the child whose embryonic beginning 
was biopsied to obtain them—has its own ethical 
difficulties. Techniques would have to be developed for 
deriving pluripotent stem cells, not only from whole early-
stage human embryos, but also from individual 
blastomeres extracted from an embryo. It may prove 
difficult to develop and refine those techniques without 
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exposing many human embryos to death and injury.* If 
embryo biopsy is to be embraced as a morally 
uncontroversial way to derive stem cells, the research 
needed to test the proposal and perfect the technique 
would have to avoid killing or harming human embryos. It 
is far from clear that the necessary research can be 
accomplished with this restriction in place. Even if a 
perfected technique could someday derive stem cells from 
single blastomeres harmlessly obtained, the failure to 
satisfy this testing-stage ethical requirement could render 
this option ethically little better than the currently 
controversial methods for deriving embryonic stem cells. 
 
5. Changing the practices of assisted reproduction.  
 
There is ethically more at stake in this proposal than the 
fate of individual biopsied embryos. There are also large 
issues raised by the direct intrusion of research objectives 
into the practice of reproductive medicine, while it is being 
practiced (that is, in the moments when decisions about 
embryo transfer are still being made). The Landry-Zucker 
proposal would make available for stem cell derivation 
only those embryos that had already died. In contrast, this 
embryo-biopsy proposal would manipulate still-living 
embryos immediately destined for reproductive transfer. 
From the perspective of the would-be parents, is it really 
better for them (and for their child-to-be) if those 
performing PGD are concerned not only with good 
diagnosis but also with procuring useful cells for a research 
                                                 
* Indeed, in the initial studies showing the potential usefulness of 
morula-stage human embryos as a source of stem cells, many human 
embryos were obviously destroyed. 
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colleague? Decisions about how many and which embryos 
to transfer are often made in stressful circumstances, where 
timing is critical and the doctor’s attention is limited. 
Bringing scientists (or considerations of research) into this 
process, for reasons having nothing to do with the well-
being of parents and their children-to-be, would seem to be 
a dubious intrusion. It would also make assisted 
reproduction seem even more like manufacture, a process 
with many side uses and side benefits, rather than simply a 
way to help people have children. To say the least, much 
careful planning and oversight would be needed to prevent 
the research interest from adversely affecting the way 
reproductive medicine is practiced and the meaning it has 
for the larger society.  
 
 
B. Is It Scientifically Sound? 
 
The recent work of Strelchenko and colleagues with 
disaggregated 8-24-cell embryos suggests that whole 
human embryos as early as the 8-cell stage are potentially 
usable as a source of pluripotent stem cells. This work 
would have to be reproduced and refined before we could 
be certain that embryos at such an early stage are indeed a 
dependable source of stem cells. It would then have to be 
shown that stem cells can also be derived from isolated 
blastomeres extracted from an 8-cell embryo.* It seems far 
                                                 
* Studies with mouse embryos have shown that isolated 8-cell 
blastomeres will develop into vesicles of trophectoderm, containing 
little or no inner cell mass, making derivation of ESC lines difficult. 
And there is no reason to believe that things will be different in 
humans. However, there has been one published report claiming 
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from certain that enough cells can be extracted from the 
embryo to derive stem cells while also avoiding injury to 
the embryo.  
 
On the question of whether biopsy can be safely 
performed on early stage embryos, there is mixed evidence 
from animal studies. Krzyminska and colleagues, working 
with mouse embryos, found that “biopsy had the least 
impact when performed at the 8-cell stage.” When 
performed on 8-cell embryos, they found that biopsy did 
not significantly impair development in vitro or the rate of 
implantation after transfer; but compared to intact 
embryos, fewer biopsied embryos (52% versus 71%) 
resulted in viable fetuses.19 Because human PGD is such a 
novel, still small, and as-yet-unstudied practice, we do not 
have good data for the implantation rate for biopsied—as 
compared with non-biopsied—human embryos. 
 
In any event, since apparently healthy children have 
been born after embryo biopsy at the 8-cell stage,* it would 
                                                                                                           
derivation of mouse ESC lines from isolated 8-cell blastomeres: One cell 
line was obtained from 52 dissociated 8-cell stage embryos. (See 
Delhaise, F., et al., “Establishment of an embryonic stem cell line from 
8-cell stage mouse embryos,” European Journal of Morphology 34, 237-243 
[1996].) The Council is grateful to Dr. Janet Rossant for these 
observations. 
* Granting that apparently healthy children have been born following 
IVF and PGD, does removal of one or two blastomeres from the early 
human embryo have no effect on the child who is later born? We cannot 
be certain. There is some evidence (at least in mice) for asymmetrical 
division and distinct cell fates at the early cleavage stages. (See 
Piotrowska-Nitsche, K., et al., “Four-cell stage mouse blastomeres have 
different developmental properties,” Development 132, 479-490 [2005].) 
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appear to be possible to safely remove one or two 
blastomeres from an 8-cell embryo in order to try to 
generate a line of pluripotent human stem cells. Only 
further research and effort can settle the matter. 
 
 
C. Is It “Realistic”?  
 
Let us assume that a stage of human embryonic 
development can be identified at which cells can be 
removed without injuring the still-living embryo, that a 
non-injurious procedure for removing the cells is perfected, 
and that the cells can then be used to derive pluripotent 
stem cells. Will scientists want to work with these cells? 
And will the stem cell research be supportable by federal 
funding, that is, both eligible under the legislative 
restrictions and embraceable by administrative policies 
now in place? 
 
1. Scientific acceptance.  
 
Whether this approach is likely to be adopted by 
scientists in the future as a way to produce pluripotent 
human stem cell lines depends on several unknowns, 
central among them the efficiency of the process (for 
example, how many good stem cell lines are obtainable 
from how many biopsied embryos, and at what cost of 
effort and expense). A further crucial consideration will be 
                                                                                                           
It is possible that the loss of one or two blastomeres is entirely rectified, 
but even if development proceeds in a healthy manner, it may be that 
the child born is somehow a different child than the one that would 
have resulted from an undisturbed embryo. 
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the properties of the pluripotent stem cells that are 
produced by blastomere disaggregation of early embryos. 
If the resulting pluripotent stem cells turned out to be as 
good as or better than the current human embryonic stem 
cell lines (derived from the inner cell mass of blastocysts, a 
later stage of embryonic development), prospects for using 
this approach would improve. If, however, the proposal 
were deemed ineligible for federal funding, the prospects 
for this approach would not look very good, given that 
there are several other well-established methods for 
producing human embryonic stem cells. 
 
2. Eligibility for federal funding.  
 
An argument could be advanced that this approach 
complies with the Dickey Amendment, as long as the 
embryos biopsied are truly not harmed. But there is today 
insufficient evidence to determine whether biopsied 
embryos are, by virtue of the procedure or the removal of 
cells, in fact at risk of harm. Thus, although any derived 
pluripotent cell lines might be eligible for funding, doing 
the prior research to derive them might not be. A second 
obstacle facing such prior research would be the 
longstanding Congressional opposition to all federal 
funding of any activities involving in vitro fertilization. 
Whether the President’s policy and budget for federal 
funding of stem cell research would—or should—be 
expanded to support research on stem cell lines derived 
(with private support) from biopsied embryos is a question 
whose answer will depend not only on the issue of legal 
eligibility but also on the assessment of other ethical, 
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III. Pluripotent Stem Cells Derived from 
Biological Artifacts* 
 
Under this heading are various proposals to construct a 
biological artifact, lacking the moral status of a human 
embryo, from which pluripotent stem cells could then be 
derived. For example, Council Member William Hurlbut 
has advocated what he calls “altered nuclear transfer” 
(ANT), a procedure that, if successful, would offer a way to 
produce pluripotent stem cells within “a limited cellular 
                                                 
* Here, as in so many other ethically charged situations, terminology 
matters enormously. One must take special pains not to prejudice 
consideration of the ethical issues by choice of terms that, intentionally 
or unintentionally, incline readers and hearers one way rather than 
another. This case is no exception. Precisely because the purpose here is 
to create an entity that is not in fact a human embryo, but that is 
nevertheless enough like a human embryo that it too contains cells that 
can be cultured to give rise to pluripotent stem cells, the artificially 
produced entity must be at once “non-embryonic” yet “embryo-like.” 
But if the product is referred to as an “embryo-like” or (by analogy to 
“android”) “embryoid” body, people may be encouraged to 
overemphasize its resemblance to an embryo and to slight the claim 
that this product is decidedly not a human embryo. On the other hand, 
if the product is referred to as a “non-embryonic” body or structure, 
people may be encouraged to think that its desired non-embryonic 
character has in fact been achieved. Since a major ethical issue turns on 
whether or not the biological artifact is truly not a living human 
embryo, all prejudgment by terminological fiat should be, where 
possible, avoided. We therefore usually call it (merely) a “biological 
artifact,” denoting its origin but leaving its essential status open. 
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system that is biologically and morally akin to a complex 
tissue culture.”20 This proposal, as yet untested 
experimentally (even in animals), is conceptually based on 
modifying the procedure of somatic cell nuclear transfer 
(SCNT), now used to produce cloned embryos. In standard 
SCNT, a somatic cell nucleus is introduced into an oocyte 
(egg cell) whose own nucleus has been removed. The 
product is a cloned embryo (virtually identical, at least 
genetically, to the organism from which the donor nucleus 
was taken), the functional equivalent of a fertilized egg that 
is capable (at least in some cases) of developing into all 
later stages of the organism. ANT, the modified procedure 
proposed by Hurlbut, involves altering the somatic cell 
nucleus before its transfer to the oocyte, and in such a way 
that the resulting biological entity, while being a source of 
pluripotent stem cells, would lack the essential attributes and 
capacities of a human embryo. For example, the altered 
nucleus might be engineered to lack a gene or genes that 
are crucial for the cell-to-cell signaling and integrated 
organization essential for (normal) embryogenesis.21 It 
would therefore lack organized development from the very 
earliest stages of cell differentiation. Such an entity would 
be a “biological artifact,” not an organism. Removal of cells 
from, or even disaggregation of, this artifact would not be 
killing or harming, for there is no living being here to be 
killed or harmed. After extraction from this artifact, the 
cells could have the missing gene or genes reinserted, with 
a view to deriving “normal” pluripotent stem cells from 
them. 
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A. Is It Ethically Sound? 
 
 In offering his proposal for ANT, Hurlbut emphasizes 
that no embryo would ever be created or destroyed; since 
the genetic alteration is carried out in the somatic cell 
nucleus before transfer, the biological artifact is “brought 
into existence with a genetic structure insufficient to 
generate a human embryo.” Hurlbut compares the product 
of ANT to certain ovarian teratomas and hydatidiform 
moles, genetically or epigenetically abnormal natural 
products of failed fertilization that are not living beings but 
“chaotic, disorganized, and nonfunctional masses.” If, as 
Hurlbut suggests, the biological artifact is ethically 
equivalent to a tissue culture, teratoma, or mole, there 
would seem to be nothing ethically problematic about 
harvesting stem cells from it. Nonetheless, a number of 
ethical questions and concerns have been raised about this 
proposal. 
 
1. Would not this “artifact” really be a very defective embryo?  
 
Some people have wondered about the accuracy of the 
claim that no embryo creation or destruction is entailed by 
the proposal. They understand that the proposed biological 
artifact has, from the beginning, a built-in genetic defect 
that prevents it from developing normally. Yet they worry 
that this is not the production of a non-human entity but 
the deliberate creation of a doomed or disabled human 
embryo, or, in other words, that Hurlbut’s proposal 
amounts to creating and using “bad or sick embryos,” 
rather than “non-embryonic entities.” Hurlbut’s claim that 
his method would not yield a defective embryo rests on the 
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fact that a genetic alteration sufficient to prevent 
embryogenesis is introduced into the nucleus before it is 
transferred to the oocyte, and that the alteration would be 
so fundamental that it would preclude the integrated 
organization that characterizes a human embryonic 
organism. If no embryo is created, then none is violated, 
mutilated or destroyed (which would be the case if the 
alteration were introduced after normal fertilization).  
 
Nonetheless, some critics wonder how the product of 
that nuclear transfer is in fact essentially different from—
and less an embryo than—a fertilized egg into which the 
same disabling genetic alteration is introduced only after 
normal fertilization. A person’s perception of the truth in 
this matter may depend on how easy it is to turn the 
genetic defect on or off. The easier it is to activate and 
deactivate the genetic defect, the more this proposal looks 
like interfering with the normal development of an embryo 
rather than manufacture of an artificial non-organismic 
structure. Unless it can be shown that the artifact is not 
truly an embryo—that is, that it lacks (by design) the 
possibility of becoming not only a live-born human but an 
organized, differentiating early human embryo and fetus—
there will likely be ethical debate on whether it is 
permissible to continue “abusing” the embryo-like entity 
by suppressing the genes it needs for development. 
Furthermore, even if the artifact were conclusively shown to 
lack genes indispensable for becoming an organized, 
differentiating human embryo, some critics might continue 
to insist that it was destined to become a defective, severely 
deformed human embryo, the defect and deformity having 
been deliberately inflicted on it by the scientist. 
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Experimental work in animals, however, might help 
resolve these questions and allay these concerns. If, for 
example, the biological artifact begins to grow in ways that 
resemble unorganized cells in a tissue culture, critics may 
gain confidence in the non-embryonic character of the 
product. 
 
2. The ethics of egg procurement. 
 
Like ordinary cloning-for-biomedical-research (SCNT), 
this altered nuclear transfer proposal requires a (probably 
large) supply of human oocytes, which would have to be 
donated, purchased, or produced for research purposes. 
Some will find this troubling, and on multiple grounds. 
Obtaining human oocytes currently requires hormonal 
stimulation and superovulation in the women who would 
be donating or selling their eggs, practices that carry 
significant medical risks to the women, risks not easily 
justified when they themselves or their prospective 
children are not the beneficiaries of the oocyte retrieval (as 
are women undergoing these procedures in hopes of 
having children). In addition to the medical risks, there are 
also ethical concerns about the practice of commercializing 
human reproductive tissue and about any buying and 
selling of eggs: the exploiting of poor women, the 
coarsening of society’s sensibilities, the developing of 
markets in (reproductive) human tissues. More deeply, one 
critic suggests, we must consider the implications and the 
consequences of coming to regard human eggs and sperm 
as fungible raw materials, to be used in ways that have 
nothing to do with their procreative biological and human 
meaning. There is a risk that, in seeking to avoid the 
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problem of embryo destruction, we would thus be 
furthering a dehumanized and utilitarian view of human 
beginnings as bad as the one that this alternative proposal 
was trying to combat.22 
 
There is, at least in theory, the possibility that human 
oocytes can be obtained not from women egg donors by 
superovulation but from ovaries surgically removed from 
patients or harvested from cadavers. The ooocyte 
precursors extracted from these ovaries could then be 
matured in vitro. Alternatively, the ovaries could be 
transplanted into animal hosts and eggs produced by 
hormonal stimulation of the animals.23 Research in this area 
is at a very preliminary stage. And the objections just noted 
to non-reproductive uses of human reproductive tissue 
could also be raised to obtaining eggs in these non-invasive 
ways, should they ever become possible. 
 
3. Ethical concerns about ANT itself. 
 
To some observers, the procedures involved in ANT are 
inherently objectionable. Certain commentators, for 
example, find the very idea of tampering to put something 
destructive into the human genome, even for a good cause, 
morally and aesthetically offensive. Some find it 
aesthetically repulsive and ethically suspect to be creating 
such neither-living-nor-nonliving, near-human artifacts, a 
practice they regard as ethically no improvement over 
destroying early embryos. Other critics of the ANT proposal 
argue that, while it is ethically acceptable to modify the 
human genome for treatment (with consent) of individuals 
with known genetic disorders, it is quite another thing to 
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do so for other than therapeutic purposes or to do so in 
eggs or sperm before there is an existing needy individual. 
Some think this is a major ethical boundary that ought not 
to be crossed lightly.24 Others are troubled by the attitude 
of mastery or hubris implied in a project that aims at 
engineering a human biological artifact. 
 
In response to these objections, Hurlbut replies that the 
ANT technique would be used only for serious scientific 
research within the frame of therapeutic purposes 
beneficial to a large population whose medical needs are of 
grave concern. Further, he points out that we accept many 
medical and research practices that are aesthetically ugly 
and morally worrisome, from cutting into a living body or 
brain, to giving people a dose of disease for vaccination, to 
growing great sheets of skin from cells harvested from 
foreskins. We do these things—and many others like 
them—in the service of the higher goal of healing, the very 
goal to which the ANT proposal is dedicated.25 
 
4. Concerns about ANT on “slippery slope” grounds.  
 
Several worries have been expressed not about the 
proposal itself but about what it might lead to, or about 
what it might be seen as justifying in the future. For some, 
the proposal appears to open the door to a troubling new 
field of biomedical engineering. True, its initial relatively 
modest goal is only to produce a biological artifact capable 
of yielding pluripotent human stem cells while not itself 
being a complete human organism with developmental 
potential. And if, in the process, definite criteria could be 
established for distinguishing between the not-human and 
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the human, this proposal might have the salutary effect of 
erecting boundaries that would open avenues for scientific 
advance without threatening human dignity, boundaries 
that do not now govern the practices of human embryo 
research in the private sector. But, extrapolating into the 
future from an ANT precedent, pursuing this proposal 
could—whether intentionally or not—help to launch a new 
field of bioengineering, devoted to manufacturing 
intermediate biological forms that are sufficiently human to 
yield useful biomedical materials, but not so human that it 
would be unethical to destroy or exploit them. Hurlbut’s 
arguments could be adapted to justify the deliberate 
production of teratomas, hydatidiform moles, inter-species 
hybrids, and other ill-formed, non-viable, but potentially 
useful biological artifacts. Once we start down the road of 
deliberately engineering artificial entities with some human 
properties, it is not obvious how bright ethical boundaries 
between the acceptable and the unacceptable can be drawn.  
 
A second “slippery slope” concern has to do with the 
flexibility of the developmental stage at which disordered 
growth is set to begin. Hurlbut’s proposal involves 
building in a genetic alteration that causes development to 
go irretrievably awry from the very start of embryonic 
development. But suppose a useful genetic modification 
were achieved that entailed chaotic and disorganized 
development only at a later stage of embryonic (or even 
fetal) development. Could not the ethical reasoning in 
defense of ANT be used to argue that such further-
developed but still inherently defective entities are “fetus-
like but not actual fetuses,” and hence ethically suitable for 
exploitation and destruction? (The same question is 
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relevant for ongoing destructive embryo research using 
normal IVF embryos, whose exploitation and destruction 
are justified because of the human benefits they might 
eventually bring.) It would certainly be troubling if the 
ethical case for ANT could be used to justify the creation 
and destruction of fetus-like entities. Hurlbut’s proposal, 
seeking a source of pluripotent human stem cells, confines 
its attention to the early stages of embryonic development. 
But someone looking for a source of tissues or even 
primordial organs might be tempted to apply his reasoning 
to later and later stages of development, not excluding the 
deliberate production of anencephalic fetuses or even 
newborns, useful as a source of organs and tissues. 
Hurlbut’s criterion for being a truly human organism—
“organization of the species-typical kind”—would appear 
to be inherently malleable and open to interpretation (and 
even mischief). 
 
Arguments that worry about future extensions of 
present techniques, or future applications to dubious ends, 
or future uses of current ethical justifications to validate 
later unsavory practices, while worth considering, tend to 
assume that people are either unable or unwilling to draw 
the necessary distinctions and erect the necessary ethical 
boundaries between current acceptable practices and future 
unacceptable ones—an assumption that is readily subject to 
dispute. But since the truth of this assumption cannot be 
known in advance, and can only be demonstrated case by 
case and then only by going forward and running the 
predicted risks, there is at least some reason to wonder 
whether any newly devised technological solution to the 
ethical problem of embryo destruction will not, in the end, 
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be creating or contributing to ethical problems worse than 
the one it set out to cure. 
 
 
B. Is It Scientifically Sound? 
 
Although the proposal for ANT has yet to be tested, 
several scientists have indicated that they believe that it can 
easily be made to work, and a few are apparently ready to 
try it out in non-human animals. It would be crucial to 
show that the disorganizing genetic or epigenetic alteration 
introduced into the somatic cell nucleus before transfer 
could be fully controlled, with predictable results, and fully 
reversed without residual abnormalities in the derived cells 
extracted from the embryo-like artifact. For unless the 
genetic engineering were fully reversible, the resulting 
stem cells would likely carry genetic or other alterations 
that might compromise the value of the stem cells. 
Moreover, there may be a tension in this proposal between 
ethical considerations, which require that insurmountable 
developmental barriers be genetically built into the 
embryo-like entity from the start, and technical feasibility, 
which would favor simpler barriers to development that 
are easily and completely reversible. Presumably, the more 
hard-wired the introduced defect is, the more difficult it 
will be to reverse. However, it is quite possible that, with a 
sufficiently determined research program, even the more 
technically daunting versions of the proposal could be 
achieved. 
 
It is important to note that both some of the strengths 
and some of the weaknesses of the ANT proposal come 
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from the fact that it is basically a form of SCNT or cloning. 
On the positive side, if successful, ANT could provide stem 
cells with a much greater diversity of genotypes than is 
possible under current methods of stem cell derivation (or 
under the other two proposals we have considered so far*), 
allowing a far wider range of medical possibilities such as 
disease modeling or drug testing. Likewise, ANT would 
allow the generation of pluripotent stem cell lines with pre-
engineered alterations (such as enhanced immune response 
or correction of a genetic defect) that might make them of 
more scientific interest or therapeutic value.  
 
On the negative side, however, attempts to clone 
mammals have so far resulted in high rates of death, 
deformity, and disability in the animals that come to birth 
following SCNT. In 2002, research in the laboratory of 
Rudolph Jaenisch at MIT showed that, in cloned mice, 
about 4% of genes function abnormally, owing mainly not 
to mutations but to departures from normal activation or 
expression of certain genes.26 It is not yet known whether 
similar genetic or epigenetic abnormalities will also be 
found in any stem cell lines that might be derived by ANT. 
Such problems are much less likely to be encountered in 
stem cell lines derived from IVF embryos.  
                                                 
* This advantage would, however, be shared by the next proposal, 
somatic cell dedifferentiation. 
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C. Is It “Realistic”?  
 
1. Scientific acceptance.  
 
Compared to deriving human embryonic stem cells 
from normal blastocysts, procedures such as ANT are quite 
complex and would yield cells that would then have to be 
restored to genetic normality before stem cell lines could be 
derived. Many scientists, we suspect, would be reluctant to 
attempt such challenging feats with no rational purpose 
other than to satisfy the ethical objections of others, and 
one prominent scientist in the stem cell and cloning field 
has recently made such a complaint publicly 
(notwithstanding the fact that the company for which he 
works has filed a patent application for precisely such a 
procedure).27 Other scientists have reacted to news of the 
ANT proposal by describing it as exceedingly complex and 
technically challenging, not even testable without time-
consuming experiments involving substantial investment 
of precious resources.28 Even if federal funding for research 
on ANT-derived stem cell lines were approved, stem cell 
scientists might prefer to seek private funding of 
unrestricted stem cell research rather than follow 
procedures that seem to them burdensome and 
scientifically useless. Also, as Hurlbut himself 
acknowledges, proof of principle and safety-and-efficacy 
experiments need first to be done in animals, and it might 
be many months or even years before this process could be 
perfected using human tissues. Many stem-cell scientists, 
eager to press forward, are unlikely to wait for these new 
lines, especially if they are not themselves bothered by the 
embryo destruction that necessarily results when stem cell 
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preparations are derived, as they are now, from unused 
IVF embryos. On the other hand, there may be some 
scientists, either opposed themselves to destroying 
embryos or hoping to find a way around the current 
federal funding restrictions, who would be willing and 
even eager to test Hurlbut’s proposal in animals, and 
several have apparently volunteered their collaborative 
services for such animal trials. 
 
2. Eligibility for federal funding. 
 
 If the biological artifacts created and destroyed under 
this proposal were persuasively shown not to be human 
embryos, the proposal would presumably be deemed 
consistent with the Dickey Amendment and therefore 
eligible for federal funding. Whether the President’s policy 
and budget for federal funding of stem cell research 
would—or should—be expanded to support research on 
ANT or other biological artifacts (even in animals) is a 
question whose answer will depend not only on the issue 
of legal eligibility but also on the assessment of other 
ethical, scientific, and prudential considerations of the sort 
we have just discussed. 
 
 
D. Pluripotent Stem Cells via “Parthenogenesis.” 
 
 Besides Hurlbut’s ANT proposal, other methods of 
constructing embryo-like artificial structures are under 
investigation, including a technique recently demonstrated 
by Karl Swann and colleagues at the University of Wales 
College of Medicine, in which a human oocyte is 
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biochemically “tricked into thinking it has been 
fertilized.”29 The treated eggs divide to the blastocyst stage 
(50-100 cells), at which point stem cells can presumably be 
derived.30 Although it undergoes several cycles of cell 
division, the “parthenogenetic” (that is, unfertilized but 
still developing) blastocyst-like entity is assumed by most 
commentators to lack entirely the potential for 
development as a human being, and is therefore, arguably, 
not really an embryo.* If this is correct, then this technique 
might provide another means for deriving pluripotent stem 
cells without creating or destroying embryos. Yet the only 
experiment that could prove whether this plausible 
assumption is in fact correct—transferring a 
parthenogenetic embryo to a woman to try to bring it to 
birth—cannot be ethically attempted. In the absence of such 
proof, the biological and moral status of the 
parthenogenetic blastocysts is likely to remain in doubt and 
controversial. Still, those who are convinced that 
parthenogenetic embryos have no chance of development 
beyond the blastocyst stage are likely to have few ethical 
objections to the production and use of such entities.31 It 
remains to be seen whether viable and genetically stable 
pluripotent stem cells can be derived from these 
parthenogenetic blastocysts and whether imprinting and 
other issues related to their parthenogenetic origin might 
limit their utility in research or potential clinical trials. 
Under the present terms of the Dickey Amendment, this 
proposal would be unlikely to be eligible for federal 
                                                 
* However, live-birth parthenogenesis takes place naturally in certain 
amphibians and has been induced artificially even in mice. See Kono, 
T., et al., “Birth of parthenogenetic mice that can develop to adulthood” 
(Letters to Nature), Nature 428, 860-864 (2004). 
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funding, since the amendment specifically prohibits the use 
of federal funds for research that may cause harm to an 




IV. Pluripotent Stem Cells via Somatic Cell 
Dedifferentiation 
 
 A quite different route to the production of pluripotent 
stem cells would be to reprogram differentiated somatic 
cells so as to restore to them the pluripotency typical of 
embryonic stem cells. The obstacles here are not ethical, but 
technical. Because it involves neither the creation nor the 
destruction of human embryos, the common ethical 
objection to human embryonic stem cell research would 
not apply. But it would take new scientific advances and 
new technological innovation before such 
“dedifferentiation” of somatic cells back into pluripotent 
stem cells could be achieved. Several suggestions have, 
however, been offered for how such dedifferentiation 
might be achieved, and the value of success cannot be 
overstated. For if it were possible to undo the 
differentiation of somatic cells, running development in 
reverse back to the state of pluripotency, it would in 
principle be possible for autologous pluripotent stem cells 
to be obtained from the body of any human being. Such 
individualized stem cells would then be available as a 
potential source of personalized, immuno-compatible 
regenerative therapies. 
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A. Is It Ethically Sound? 
 
There would seem to be nothing to object to ethically if 
procedures were developed to turn somatic cells into 
pluripotent stem cells, non-embryonic functional 
equivalents of embryonic stem cells. Of course, if the 
dedifferentiation were pursued beyond (mere) 
pluripotency to the point of yielding a totipotent cell—in 
effect, a cloned human zygote—the moral status of such a 
cell would become a serious issue, as would the 
permissibility of using it either for reproductive or for 
research purposes. For a totipotent cell is, arguably, an 
organism at the unicellular stage, and a strong case could 




B. Is It Scientifically Sound? 
 
 Research into dedifferentiation of somatic cells is at a 
preliminary stage, and it is much too early to know 
whether this will succeed. It may prove possible to culture 
specific populations of somatic cells—cells that may be 
especially susceptible to dedifferentiation—under 
conditions that might get them to reverse their 
differentiating epigenetic changes, thereby leading them to 
become more multipotent or even completely pluripotent; 
there is also some hope of identifying and isolating the 
chemical factors present in oocytes and other cells (such as 
ESCs) that are responsible for maintaining or restoring cells 
to pluripotency, and of using these chemicals to 
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dedifferentiate ordinary somatic cells (without the further 
need for oocytes or embryos).  
 
In nature, limited dedifferentiation is involved in the 
regeneration of missing limbs in amphibians, though the 
precise mechanism is not yet known.32 Studies have shown 
that some adult human somatic cell types (blood, liver, 
muscle) can be chemically dedifferentiated back into their 
corresponding multipotent progenitor cells (that is, adult 
stem cells).33 Several research laboratories have reported 
the direct isolation of cells from bone marrow of children 
or adults that, when cultured in vivo, have or acquire the 
capacity to differentiate into many mature cell types, 
including cells originating from all three embryonic germ 
layers.34 These cultured human multipotent cells also show 
the presence of certain biochemical properties ordinarily 
found only in human embryonic stem cells. It is interesting 
to speculate that it may be the same bone marrow stem 
cells, cultured in vitro under different conditions, that 
revert in some cases to (rather modestly multipotent) 
mesenchymal stem cells, in some other cases (further back) 
to the clearly multipotent adult progenitor cells, and in still 
other cases (yet to be achieved) to the ur-primordial stem 
cell, the fully pluripotent stem cell, functionally equivalent 
to an embryonic stem cell (though not of embryonic origin). 
If such “graded dedifferentiations” are indeed the cause of 
the variations seen among the cultivated stem cells now 
known to arise from bone-marrow stem cells, further 
research—using also stem cells obtained from umbilical 
cord blood—might very well turn out to yield the big 
payoff: fully pluripotent stem cells, obtainable at will and 
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altogether without any involvement of embryos—and well 
suited for autologous transplantation.  
 
Another possible approach to somatic cell 
dedifferentiation relies on knowledge that might be gained 
through cloning-for-biomedical-research. In SCNT or 
cloning, a somatic cell nucleus is reprogrammed back to 
totipotency by transfer into an enucleated oocyte. 
Presumably, cytoplasmic factors that are present in the 
oocyte (and that may also be present in cultured embryonic 
stem cells*) are responsible for the dedifferentiation that 
takes place. If and when these cytoplasmic factors can be 
identified and isolated, it may be possible to use them—
instead of SCNT into oocytes—to coax some ordinary 
somatic cells to dedifferentiate back to the pluripotent 
stage.35 Once again, should the process of dedifferentiation 
go too far, back to totipotency, the end result will not be a 
stem cell but the functional equivalent of a zygote, and one 
would be back in the ethical soup from which this proposal 
was intended to provide an escape. Great care would 
therefore have to be exercised to ensure that 
dedifferentiation, if and when it occurs, goes only so far 
and no further. Given the complexity of the process, and 
how little we now know about the factors that regulate 
differentiation and its opposite, it is not likely that this 
(second) approach will yield results in the near future. 
 
                                                 
* The Council is grateful to Dr. Markus Grompe for this observation. 
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C. Is It “Realistic”? 
 
1. Scientific acceptance.  
 
Certainly, dedifferentiation of somatic cells back to their 
corresponding progenitor cells will likely be welcomed as a 
powerful new way to produce large quantities of 
multipotent adult stem cells. If dedifferentiation is 
perfected to the point of yielding cells as pluripotent as 
embryonic stem cells, there is no reason to doubt that this 
procedure would be widely embraced and the cells 
obtained widely used. An additional—clinical—potential 
benefit of such cells would be that specialized cells derived 
from them (for example, heart muscle cells, nerve cells) 
could be reintroduced therapeutically into the patient from 
whom they were derived without risk of immunological 
rejection. 
 
2. Eligibility for federal funding.  
 
Because this research does not involve human embryos 
at any stage, it would not offend either the letter or the 
spirit of the Dickey Amendment. Aside from the concern 
that dedifferentiation might proceed too far (resulting in 
the functional equivalent of a zygote), there would appear 
to be no obstacle to, or reason to oppose, federal funding of 
research on dedifferentiation of somatic cells.  
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The United States has been engaged in a vigorous 
ethical debate about embryonic stem cell research, 
prompted by tensions between the desire for biomedical 
progress and respect for nascent human life. The scientific 
and medical promise of stem cells has generated enormous 
excitement among researchers and patient groups. The 
ethical issues raised by embryo research have roused 
considerable public attention and concern. Many people 
share the hope that stem cell research will eventually save 
lives and yield the promised remedies for numerous 
chronic illnesses. Many people (including many who are 
eager for regenerative medicine to succeed) share the 
concern that embryonic stem cell research depends on 
destroying human embryos and cheapens human life by 
creating and using it for experimentation.  
 
Some people hope that stem cells derived from non-
embryonic sources (known as adult stem cells) will turn 
out to be as good as stem cells derived from embryos, but it 
is too early to tell which sort of stem cells will be most 
useful for the treatment of which diseases. Some believe 
that current federal law and policy governing the funding 
of embryonic stem cell research are too restrictive, and that 
the existing embryonic stem cell lines will not prove 
adequate for the work ahead. Others believe that medical 
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progress must not be purchased by destroying human life, 
even at its earliest stages, and that creation of human 
embryos specifically for use in research should be 
outlawed. 
 
Mindful of the moral weight of the arguments on the 
various sides of this controversy, and charged with finding 
ways for science to proceed while respecting moral norms, 
the Council has taken seriously a number of recent 
proposals and suggestions for techniques to derive new 
pluripotent stem cell lines in ways that might be ethically 
uncontroversial. 
 
This White Paper has summarized several current 
proposals for obtaining pluripotent human stem cells that 
do not require destroying human embryos. In each case, we 
have examined whether the proposal is ethically sound, 
scientifically feasible, and practically “realistic.” The inquiry 
we have undertaken constitutes no more than a preliminary 
hearing, designed mainly to see whether there are any 
insuperable ethical, scientific, or practical objections to 
further consideration of these proposals. Because all of 
these proposals are relatively new, the ethical issues they 
raise need more discussion, and much research would be 
needed before it became clear which of them, if any, would 
succeed. Likewise, further legal interpretation and sober 
political deliberation would be required to determine 
which of the proposals are, under current law, eligible for 
federal funding and which are both ethically and 
scientifically deserving of such official national support. We 
hope that our analyses of the ethical, scientific, and 
practical aspects of these proposals will contribute to a 
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more informed and comprehensive scrutiny of their 
respective merits. 
 
The analyses of this White Paper, while preliminary, do 
lead to the following provisional assessments. The last 
proposal, dedifferentiating somatic cells back to 
pluripotency, seems ethically the most unobjectionable, but 
for now scientifically and technically uncertain; recent 
derivations (from adults) of relatively undifferentiated 
multipotent stem cell lines* may be an encouraging, albeit 
preliminary, step toward this goal. The first proposal, 
seeking to derive stem cells from organismically dead 
embryos, has yet to be tested, even in animals. But the 
natural history studies proposed could be undertaken 
forthwith and in an ethical manner, not only in animals but 
also in humans, and we might learn soon whether reliable 
objective criteria for determining death of IVF embryos can 
be developed. The second proposal, seeking to develop 
stem cells from blastomeres extractable from living 
embryos, is also now technically feasible, though large 
ethical difficulties remain, concerning especially the 
propriety of imposing risks of embryo biopsy and 
blastomere removal on the born child the embryo might 
become, solely for research of no benefit to him or her. The 
third proposal, seeking to derive stem cells from 
genetically engineered artificial entities, is technically the 
most demanding and ethically the most complex and 
puzzling. Even its proponents agree that it would need to 
be carefully tested in animals before any thought of human 
trials could be countenanced. 
                                                 
* See endnote 34. 
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Among these several proposals, the Council has no 
unanimous recommendation to make. Different Council 
members are drawn more to one or less to another of the 
four proposals. Each of us weighs the ethical issues 
differently. And we have differing views on which 
approach is likely to succeed technically or to be useful 
practically. A few of us may suspect that the quest for 
alternative sources of stem cells is misguided, and that we 
should continue using the embryos we have (or can 
produce directly) in order to get any new stem cell lines we 
need.  
 
Yet on the limited ethical threshold question—“Does this 
proposal appear to meet a minimum ethical standard to 
justify further serious consideration and scientific 
exploration?”—the Council offers the following provisional 
conclusions.36  
 
The first proposal, deriving cells from organismically dead 
embryos. Although it raises some serious ethical questions, 
we find this proposal to be ethically acceptable for basic 
investigation in humans, provided that stringent guidelines 
like those proposed by Drs. Landry and Zucker are strictly 
observed. The results of such investigations would help to 
determine whether the method would in fact prove 
ethically acceptable in the long run. 
 
The second proposal, blastomere extraction from living 
embryos. We find this proposal to be ethically unacceptable 
in humans, owing to the reasons given in the ethical 
analysis: we should not impose risks on living embryos 
destined to become children for the sake of getting stem 
A WHITE PAPER OF 





cells for research. This approach could, of course, be 
attempted in animals, but we do not yet see how results 
from animal experimentation could alter this assessment of 
ethical propriety in humans. We do not expect this method 
to become ethically acceptable for human trials in the 
future.  
 
The third proposal, cells derived from specially engineered 
biological artifacts. Because this proposal raises many serious 
ethical concerns, we do not believe that it is at this time 
ethically acceptable for trials with human material. 
Although a few of us are not eager to endorse even animal 
and other laboratory work investigating potential human 
applications, most of us believe the proposal offers enough 
promise to justify animal experimentation, both to offer 
proof of feasibility and utility and to get evidence bearing 
on some of the ethical issues. We find no insuperable 
ethical objections to pursuing this proposal in animal 
models, which is, we note again, all that the proponents 
now seek to do. The possibility of any future endorsement 
of trying this approach in humans will depend upon a 
more thorough ethical analysis made possible in part by 
animal experiments.  
 
The fourth proposal, cells obtained by somatic cell 
dedifferentiation. We find this proposal to be ethically 
unproblematic and acceptable for use in humans, if and 
when it becomes scientifically practical, provided the line 
between pluripotency and totipotency can be maintained, 
as discussed in the ethical analysis. 
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Despite any differences among us about the merits of 
each proposal, the Council shares the view that the group 
of proposals here discussed—and others like them that 
they might stimulate—deserve the nation’s careful and 
serious consideration. Because the Council is 
wholeheartedly committed both to the advancement of 
science for the betterment of humankind and to the defense 
of human freedom, dignity, and the value of human life, 
we are pleased to endorse these proposals as worthy of further 
public discussion, and we are pleased to encourage their 
scientific exploration in accordance with the preliminary ethical 
judgments just offered. A good part of our uncertainty today 
about the merits of these proposals rests on the paucity of 
available scientific evidence and of demonstrated technical 
prowess. Both enthusiasts and skeptics regarding these 
proposals should agree at least on this: that further 
empirical studies will be needed before the true potential of 
these proposals can be properly assessed.  
 
We conclude by stressing that while these four 
proposals are the ones that seem most worthy of analysis 
and discussion at this time, it is altogether possible, indeed 
likely, that other avenues to human pluripotent stem cells 
not requiring the destruction of human embryos may be 
proposed or discovered in the future. By limiting ourselves 
to these current proposals, we do not intend to exclude any 
additional ones. On the contrary, we publish this White 
Paper to encourage scientists to creatively devise other and 
better proposals and to highlight the appeal of the larger 
purpose: to find ways to advance pluripotent stem cell 
research that all our fellow citizens can wholeheartedly 
support. That end is, in the view of the Council, a desirable 
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goal for our society and one that justifies making the extra 
effort to seek out, assess, and attempt new, ethically 
uncontroversial methods of stem cell derivation. 
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differentiate into various adult tissue types, including neuronal and 
pancreatic islet tissue. See D’Ippolito, G., et al., “Marrow-isolated adult 
multilineage inducible (MIAMI) cells, a unique population of postnatal 
young and old human cells with extensive expansion and 
differentiation potential,” Journal of Cell Science 117, 2971-2981 (2004). 
The relation between the MIAMI cells and Dr. Verfaillie’s MAPCs is 
unclear, although it is possible that the MIAMI cells may be somewhat 
less differentiated than the MAPCs. The research from both 
laboratories needs to be reproduced by other scientists before its true 
promise can be assessed. See also Yoon, Y-S., et al., “Clonally expanded 
novel multipotent stem cells from human bone marrow regenerate 
myocardium after myocardial infarction,” The Journal of Clinical 
Investigation 115, 326-338 (2005), and Kogler, G., et al., “A new human 
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somatic stem cell from placental cord blood with intrinsic pluripotent 
differentiation potential,” Journal of Experimental Medicine 200, 123-135 
(2004). 
 
35 See, in particular, Byrne, J. A., et al., “Nuclei of adult mammalian 
somatic cells are directly reprogrammed to oct-4 stem cell gene 
expression by amphibian oocytes,” Current Biology 13, 1206-1213 (2003), 
and Gurdon, J. B., Byrne, J. A., Simonsson, S., “Nuclear reprogramming 
and stem cell creation,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
USA 100 (Suppl. 1), 11819-11822 (September 30, 2003).  
 
36 For the Council’s discussion that gave rise to these provisional 
conclusions, see transcript of the Council’s March 4, 2005, meeting 

























 The preceding text constitutes the official body of this White Paper; 
it stands as the work of the entire Council. In the interest of 
contributing further to public discussion of the issues, and of enabling 
individual members of the Council to speak in their own voice on one 
or another aspect of this White Paper, we offer in this Appendix 
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Personal Statement of Dr. Gazzaniga 
 
 
I do not support publishing this report with the implied 
endorsement that special efforts be made in the scientific areas 
described. While some of the suggestions could be explored in a 
scientific setting, most are high-risk options that only have an outside 
chance of success and raise their own complex set of ethical questions. 
Of primary concern: this effort is a diversion from the simple task at 
hand which is to move forward with the established laboratory 
techniques, that are already grounded on a clear ethical basis, for 
studying embryonic stem cell research and biomedical cloning.  
 
The simple proposals that are now widely accepted by the majority 
of ethicists and scientists alike are as follows: 
 
Allow the use of spare IVF embryos to develop more human stem 
cell lines. These are entities that do not possess a single neuron and are 
ready to go and can create tens of thousands of cell lines. Put another 
way, a piece of DNA is not a human being. A human being is an entity 
with a functioning brain consisting of billions of neurons with trillions 
of synapses that develops over time and with crucial interactions with 
the environment. 
 
Allow biomedical cloning (SCNT) to go forward. This laboratory 
procedure has been tested and it works. SCNT can only be carried out 
in a laboratory and the 14-day-old entity that results from the 
procedure also has not a single neuron. After the specific stem cells are 
harvested by 14 days, the remaining tissue is disposed of. 
 
From a purely scientific point of view I offer the following remarks 
on the alternative suggestions made by the Council, based on 
consultation with stem cell experts: 
 
Proposal 1, the Landry-Zucker proposal, is absolutely dependent on 
defining a battery of “death markers.” The criteria they offer lack the 
specificity and selectivity required. To what degree, for example is 
“embryo-dead” analogous to “brain dead?” What are the long-term 




consequences (through adulthood) of using blastomeres from “dead” 
morulae? These are answerable, but formidable problems. Blastomere 
removal must be validated in vitro and in vivo, with respect to mitosis, 
survival, differentiation, etc., none of which are inaccessible. No 
assumption whatsoever can be made that these are “normal cells.” At 
the same time, these questions are scientifically accessible. 
 
Proposal 2, relies on biopsy, and this represents a new field, which 
must be explored experimentally. For example, and most obviously, 
what is the relationship of cellular to organ removal and 
transplantation? Are the biological rules homologous? We need the 
data. 
 
Proposal 3, Bill Hurlbut’s proposal, is also scientifically tractable, 
though fraught with ethical conundrums. Defective nuclear transfer 
could certainly be accomplished in theory, though issues of viability, 
etc., would be paramount. And replacing genes at the “wrong” time 
could be devastating either acutely or chronically. Although a myriad 
of additional potential problems could be cited, they are again 
empirical, not theoretical. Why delay what we know works with this 
sideshow? As pointed out in the paper, one of the leading stem cell 
research scientists in the world, Dr. Doug Melton at Harvard, has 
written an article in the New England Journal of Medicine dismissing this 
idea both scientifically and practically. 
 
Proposal 4, dedifferentiation, is similarly approachable scientifically, 
though it is a high-risk strategy. Questions, however, raised with this 
idea can be answered with a huge and costly scientific program in 
place.  
 
At the same time and from an ethical perspective, I must add that I 
find this proposal strained at best. Winding the clock back on a 
developed somatic cell and to stop it at a critical point is supposed to 
be void of ethical issues while letting a cell grow forward to just before 
the same point as with SCNT is not ethical?  
 
This is the potentiality argument in reverse. In one version the film 
of life is running forward and in the other it is running in reverse. In 
both scenarios humans are making decisions about life and its origins. 
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It reveals how the so-called ethical concerns are being laid over 
molecular events moving either forward or backward in time. 
 
In summary, these proposals, in spite of being experimentally 
approachable, are, ultimately, high-risk gambles. Each presents 
formidable, but not impossible, technical problems. The scientific 
challenges must not be confounded with the complex moral issues. 
Most troubling, this effort dilutes the essential question: Is the United 
States of America going to allow embryonic stem cell research and 
biomedical cloning to go forward using the now widely accepted 
techniques used by the private sector, by the State of California, and by 
dozens of other countries, or is it going to remain hostage to the 




MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA 
 






Personal Statement of Professor George 
(joined by Professor Glendon and Dr. Gómez-Lobo) 
 
 
I support the Council’s efforts to identify means of obtaining 
human pluripotent stem cells for biomedical research that do not 
involve killing or harming human embryos and do not invite the 
exploitation of women to obtain ova. If such means can be identified, 
research involving embryonic or embryonic-type stem cells could go 
forward, and be funded by the federal government, without ethical 
qualms and controversy. Assuming that supporters of embryonic stem 
cell research and its public funding are sincere in saying that they have 
no intention or desire to derive tissue or organs from post-implantation 
human embryos or from human fetuses, this would bring to a close—
honorably and without rancor—a divisive chapter in our recent 
history. Frankly, I do not see how any person of goodwill could be 
opposed to such a resolution of the matter. 
 
I commend everyone who has stepped forward to propose possible 
methods of obtaining human pluripotent stem cells while fully 
respecting human life at every stage of development. I thank our 
Council’s staff and consultants who have helped to provide in this 
White Paper a thorough, if necessarily in some ways still preliminary, 
analysis of each of the four proposals we sketch and analyze. Although 
I do not hold out hope of obtaining pluripotent stem cells harmlessly 
via blastomere extraction from living human embryos (proposal II), I 
believe that each of the other three proposals merits further exploration 
(including, where indicated, experimental research involving non-
human animal cells) and analysis. 
 
The best long-term solution is likely to be somatic cell 
dedifferentiation (proposal IV). But while scientists work towards the 
goal of dedifferentiating somatic cells back to their corresponding 
progenitor cells, it may be possible ethically to employ one or both of 
the other two methods, namely deriving cells from embryos that have 
died (proposal I) or from nonembryonic entities produced by altered 
nuclear transfer (proposal III). I say, with emphasis, may be because 
serious moral and practical concerns have been raised about both 
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proposals. Research and further analysis will be required to determine 
whether the proposed methods are technologically possible and 
ethically sound. That research and analysis should, in my opinion, go 
forward. 
 
Of the four possible methods explored in our White Paper, the one 
that has attracted the most intense interest outside the Council is 
altered nuclear transfer. There are two major concerns: (1) the question 
whether the entity produced would be truly non-embryonic, and not a 
disabled embryo or an embryo genetically programmed for a 
premature death; and (2) the question whether ova could be supplied 
without subjecting women to the painful and possibly dangerous 
process of superovulation. Neither of these questions is, strictly 
speaking, ethical, though both have what I consider to be decisive 
ethical implications. Like Dr. Hurlbut, who has taken the lead in 
formulating this proposal, I will not support altered nuclear transfer as 
a method of obtaining human pluripotent stem cells unless it can be 
shown that (1) the procedure truly and reliably produces 
nonembryonic entities, rather than damaged embryos, and (2) it is 
possible to carry out altered nuclear transfer on the scale required 
without subjecting women to harmful and exploitative practices. 
 
I recognize that some people have objections to altered nuclear 
transfer even if these conditions are met. Dr. Krauthammer, for 
example, objects even if the sources of stem cells created can be shown 
truly to be nonembryonic. Because Dr. Krauthammer also objects (as I 
do) to the creation for destruction of true embryos (by cloning or any 
other method), I take his concerns very seriously and welcome his 
criticisms of my own more permissive view. I would not finally 
endorse altered nuclear transfer using human cells prior to engaging 
the argument with him more fully and considering with the utmost 
care the considerations he adduces against it. 
 
It is more difficult to credit the ethical objections to altered nuclear 
transfer of those who support the creation of true embryos to be 
destroyed in biomedical research. How can it be right deliberately to 
create and destroy true human embryos—beings that no one can deny 
are human individuals in the embryonic stage of development—yet 
somehow wrong to produce disorganized growths that are the moral 
equivalent of gamete tumors rather than embryos? 




One final point: the effort in which I am happy to join to find 
morally legitimate means of obtaining embryonic or embryonic-type 
stem cells should not be interpreted as indicating any acceptance of the 
hyping of the therapeutic promise of embryonic stem cell research that 
has marred the debate over the past four years. This promotion of 
exaggerated expectations dishonors science and shames those 
responsible for it by cruelly elevating the hopes of suffering people and 
members of their families. It should be condemned. 
 
 
ROBERT P. GEORGE 
(JOINED BY MARY ANN GLENDON 










Personal Statement of Dr. Hurlbut 
 
 
Since I find myself in the unusual position of being both a member 
of the Council and, at the same time, the principal advocate of one of 
the four proposals here under consideration, I am mindful that a 
delicate balancing of roles is required in the way I frame the following 
remarks. I shall take care that my comments not cross the line 
separating impartial analysis of the four proposals from partisan 
advocacy of one of them. 
 
While I believe that, by and large, the White Paper, like a good 
preliminary hearing at law, does an admirable job of presenting the 
four proposals and beginning their ethical, scientific, and practical 
analysis, it seems to me deficient in two main respects. First, I think 
there is much more to be said about the importance, for the future, of 
finding a scientific and ethical solution to the problem of deriving 
human stem cell lines. Second, I think that some of the ethical concerns 
raised about the ANT proposal could have been answered more 
effectively. In the brief remarks that follow, I will try to supply these 
two deficiencies. 
1. General comments about the importance of the project 
In our report Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry 
(July 2002), I joined colleagues who called for a moratorium on cloning-
for-biomedical-research. I believed that our nation needed time to 
consider more thoroughly the moral status of ex vivo human embryos 
and to seek scientific methods for procuring embryonic stem cells that 
could sustain social consensus for a unified federal policy. This White 
Paper both deepens the dialogue and encourages progress toward 
these goals, but it does not make it sufficiently clear why it is urgent 
that we succeed. 
 
The past three years have been characterized by controversy about 
the scientific prospects for embryonic (versus adult) stem cells and a 
widening political divide over the ethics of ESC research. Advances 




have been made in the study of ES cells, yet predictions of imminent 
cures have been moderated by a recognition of the technical difficulties 
in emulating in vitro the intercellular signals and microenvironments 
that promote cell differentiation within natural embryogenesis. 
Nonetheless, scientists generally believe that ESC research is both 
essential to the broader study of both natural development and 
pathogenesis and promising for medical interventions against a range 
of serious diseases. They also believe that, without NIH support for 
newly created ES cell lines, progress in this important realm of research 
will be severely constrained.  
 
Yet even as these scientific prospects have become clearer, 
advances in our understanding of developmental biology have 
strengthened the case of those with ethical objections to embryo 
destruction. New scientific evidence supports the idea that there is an 
integrated unity and unbroken continuity of development from 
fertilization onward—and undercuts claims that the early embryo is an 
“inchoate clump of cells,” available for instrumental use with little or 
no moral concern. 
 
These findings have solidified the convictions of many people that 
any instrumental use of human embryos must be acknowledged as a 
choice for destruction of human life (albeit at a very early stage of 
development), justified not by scientific evidence or moral reason but 
by a purely utilitarian calculus based on the promise of cures and even 
commercial considerations. This approach, grounded not on principle 
but on a balance of benefits, would seem vulnerable to being easily 
persuaded toward additional exceptions and extensions as further 
promising projects become evident.  
 
Beyond their destruction for the procurement of ES cells, some fear 
the industrial scale production of living human embryos for a wide 
range of research in natural development, toxicology, and drug testing. 
These concerns have already been aggravated by proposals to use ES 
cells in the creation of human-animal chimeras, including projects 
involving their gestation to various stages of development in the 
wombs of animals. Furthermore, some see ominous implication in the 
evidence that later stage human embryos (beyond 14 days) can provide 
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the critical conditioning environment for the transformation of adult 
stem cells into useful cell types, tissues, and possibly organs.* 
 
Our current conflict over the moral status of the human embryo 
reflects deep differences in our basic convictions and is unlikely to be 
resolved through deliberation or debate. Likewise, a purely political 
solution will leave our country bitterly divided, eroding the social 
support and sense of noble purpose that is essential for the public 
funding of biomedical science. Furthermore, the emerging patchwork 
of state policies threatens to create a situation in which many patients 
will enter the hospital with qualms about the moral foundations on 
which their treatments have been developed. The traditional sanctuary 
of compassionate care at the most vulnerable and sensitive moments of 
human life is becoming an arena of controversy and conflict. 
 
As we enter the era of developmental biology, we will face many 
more moral dilemmas; the current conflict over ES cells is just the first 
of a series of difficult controversies over the experimental use of 
emerging life that will require us to define with clarity and precision 
exactly which boundaries we seek to defend.† Chimeras, parthenotes, 
and projects involving the reaggregation of ES cell products will 
continue to challenge our definitions of human life. How we act now in 
the stem cell dilemma will set a precedent for all future efforts to exploit 
nascent human life for scientific ends. There is thus much more at stake 
than the proposals herein discussed. 
 
The proposals presented in this White Paper open a realm of 
intellectual inquiry and creative scientific investigation in the search for 
                                                 
* See Yokoo, T., et al., “Human mesenchymal stem cells in rodent whole-
embryo culture are reprogrammed to contribute to kidney tissue,” Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences USA 102(9), 3296-3300 (March 1, 2005). 
† These studies will not be limited to ES cells and the first few days of 
embryogenesis, since there are compelling scientific and medical reasons to 
seek an understanding of the entire trajectory of human biology from 
fertilization to natural death. Beyond the obvious benefit of understanding the 
fundamental biological factors behind the estimated 200,000 birth defects per 
year, it is becoming increasingly evident that pathologies that manifest 
themselves in adult life (such as hypertension, diabetes, etc.) are influenced by, 
or have their origins in, early development.  
 




a solution to our current impasse over the procurement of embryonic 
stem cells. Such a solution must be grounded in deep ethical reflection 
and in careful preliminary studies with animal cells. The 
incommensurate good of human life, and the corresponding danger of 
its instrumental use (thereby violating the principle we are trying to 
protect), mean that the highest levels of caution must prevail as we 
proceed forward with this project. We must initiate the cooperative 
dialogue that is essential to frame the moral principles that can at once 
defend human dignity and promote the fullest prospects for scientific 
progress and its medical applications. 
 
2. Answers to ethical concerns raised about ANT 
 
Throughout this report we draw a distinction between pluripotency, 
the capacity to give rise to many if not all the different cell types of the 
human body, and totipotency, the capacity to give rise to the whole 
organism as an integrated living being. Employing these concepts in 
the search for a technological solution to our ethical impasse, we must 
consider any entity that has the intrinsic potential to develop as a 
human organism (totipotency) as bearing the inviolability of a human 
life.* This status applies regardless of its means of production or 
present location.  
 
Proposals 1 (Landry-Zucker) and 3 (Altered Nuclear Transfer) may 
hold the best near-term promise for practical application, yet they also 
raise the most difficult conceptual considerations. Landry-Zucker 
would extract ES cells from embryos that are no longer totipotent, and 
Altered Nuclear Transfer (ANT) would create and extract ES cells from 
“biological artifacts” that never rise to the level of totipotency. Both 
proposals shift the ethical debate from the question of when a normal 
embryo is a human being with moral worth, to the more fundamental 
question of what component parts and organized structure constitute 
the minimal criteria for considering an entity a living human organism. 
 
Each of these proposals draws on the idea that a living organism is 
a self-subsisting being, a coordinated and coherent whole with the 
                                                 
* A practical measure of this intrinsic potential would be the ability to develop 
when provided the support and nurture of a natural gestational environment 
or its technological equivalent.  
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capacity for self-directed development, maintenance, and repair. The 
very word organism implies organization, an overarching principle of 
unity, a cooperative interaction of interdependent parts subordinated 
to the good of the whole. For an embryonic organism, this implies an 
inherent potency, a drive in the direction of the mature form. By its 
very nature, an embryo is a developing being, its wholeness defined by 
both its manifest expression and its latent potential; it is the phase of 
human life in which the organismal whole produces its organic parts.  
 
For Landry-Zucker, the conceptual and moral challenge is to define 
the meaning of “embryo death,” the cessation of integrated form and 
the totipotent capability that characterizes a living human embryo. A 
secondary, scientific challenge is to identify a physical marker of this 
state. For Altered Nuclear Transfer, the conceptual and moral challenge 
is the more difficult task of defining the boundary between mere 
cellular growth lacking integrated form and a living organism. The 
scientific challenge of ANT is to find the right genetic or epigenetic 
alteration to ensure that pluripotent cells can be produced while not 
creating an embryonic human being. It is here that the White Paper, in 
my view, does not make sufficiently clear how the proposal in fact 
meets that challenge. 
 
That an ANT product might during its earliest stages visually 
resemble an embryo does not make it an embryo, for an entity’s 
fundamental nature must ultimately be based on its internal 
biochemical structure and organization. Likewise, cell division and 
growth are not sufficient evidence that the entity is a human embryo. 
Even an egg without a nucleus, when artificially activated, has the 
developmental power to divide to the eight-cell stage, yet clearly is not 
an embryo, or even an organism. Moreover, the possibility that the 
alteration could be reversed does not affect the fact that the targeted 
alteration has preempted the ANT entity from having the nature (the 
ontological status) of an embryo.  
 
The product of ANT would, by intention, lack the active potential 
and inviolable moral nature of a living human being. Without this 
moral standing, there is no obligation of repair because there is no 
living being to be repaired. Nonetheless, even such a limited biological 
entity should be accorded a certain cautionary respect as with all 
human tissues, though not the full protection of human life. 





Some fear that the precedent of intentional genetic intervention 
(essential to ANT), and its justifying argument based on the intrinsic 
insufficiency of the entity produced, could become the basis for further 
projects in the bioengineering of ever more human-like “intermediate 
biological forms.” This is a serious consideration, but one that would 
be better addressed to those who maintain an “intermediate moral 
status” (worthy of dignity but not inviolability) for the human embryo 
and already accept the destruction of fully normal human beings at an 
early stage of their development.  
 
The very foundation of the moral argument for ANT should work 
to mitigate the concerns about the “slippery slope” potential for ES cell 
research. Since ANT seeks to defend human dignity from conception, it 
is less likely to lead to such indiscriminate and instrumental use of 
human life than the practices it seeks to preempt. By establishing a 
principled concern for the protection of human life from fertilization to 
natural death, ANT sets a firm foundation for the later distinctions 
necessary for further moral discrimination. Other proposals for the 
procurement of ES cells (SCNT and “leftover” IVF embryos) give little 
or no guidance to override the persuasive power of further promise 
from extending exceptions to moral principles. By establishing the 
primacy of ethical principle as the foundation of all scientific progress, 
ANT could help set the foundation and frame for the additional ethical 
dilemmas that will inevitably arise with advances in developmental 
biology. The difficult definitions and distinctions established in the 
moral deliberations associated with the ANT proposal could help chart 
the course and protect the path of future projects in this emerging 
arena of biology. If slippery slope arguments express prudential 
concerns, it seems reasonable to weigh ANT against the much more 
slippery scenario that will likely follow in its absence. 
 
Finally, there is the less easily argued but wider wisdom of our 
intuitive aesthetic response, and the concern that somehow we may 
violate or distort the principles of natural order that sustain the 
coherence and sense of significance of human life. I consider this the 
most compelling objection to both ANT and the whole of the modern 
project of biological intervention in the natural world. Clearly, no 
project that enters into such proximity with the most central and sacred 
realms of human life should be undertaken without a sense of 
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cautionary concern and serious purpose. Employing these powers of 
our most basic biology demands a sensitive awareness of the radiance 
of respect that must attend any technological use of body parts or 
processes apart from their proper place in the larger purposes of life. 
Nonetheless, where great good is possible, human tissues and organs 
have been used in the service of healing, and in this coming era of 
control over the primary forces of developmental biology, we will learn 
to use partial trajectories of organic growth even apart from their 
context within the living whole of the human body. The moral 
concerns and sensitivities that animate the proposal for ANT can, in 
fact, enable us to do so without losing our humanity. 
 
 
WILLIAM B. HURLBUT 











Landry and Zucker propose to thaw out embryos to follow the 
natural history of “dead” embryos. Because they do not know in 
advance which embryos will not divide and which will, some portion 
of embryos (about half) will continue to divide and will be healthy 
embryos. What happens to these healthy embryos? The proposal says 
healthy embryos in excess of those to be implanted will be allowed to 
die while scientists struggle to recoup a few living cells from the dead 
embryos! This seems to me to be the height of folly. As noted on page 




I think this is risky research, although I recognize it is currently 
done as part of prenatal genetic diagnosis. In the latter case, it is done 
to prevent implantation of an embryo with a serious disease present in 
the parents; in the former, in the present proposal, it is done to 
circumvent a problem that causes ethical concerns to some people. 
There are at least two critical questions: can you get a cell line from one 
cell or two, and does it harm the embryo that will subsequently be 
implanted? Just because experiments in mice seem to indicate that it is 
feasible in mice (but with increased inter-uterine mortality), does not 
mean it will work for human embryos. In support of this proposal, it is 
absurd to say that this cell line, if it grows, will be a source of cells for 
the child later in life. A much more effective procedure would be to 




This proposal is scientifically unsound, and for individuals 
concerned about manipulating human oocytes for experiments, it 
should be ethically unacceptable! It has proven very inefficient to 
remove the nucleus from a human oocyte and to replace it with a 
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normal, unmanipulated nucleus from a donor. In the proposed 
experiments, the donated nucleus will be made defective by some 
uncertain genetic strategy. The defective nucleus will be inserted into 
the enucleated oocytes, the oocytes will be stimulated to grow, and 
then the genetic defect will be corrected so that the cells are “normal.” 
In my view, this research asks women to donate oocytes for research 
that is highly unlikely to result in cell lines that would be useful for 
treating sick patients, which is the purpose of trying to perfect the 




This proposal does not involve embryos, but rather differentiated 
cells. The purpose aims to dedifferentiate these cells. At least some of 
the purported successes with this strategy have had flaws when 
examined carefully. This proposal should be submitted to the National 
Institutes of Health and if it passes peer review with a sufficiently high 
score to be funded, then the research will go forward. 
 
My concerns with many of these proposals is that they will use 
financial resources that would be better devoted to proposals that are 
likely to be more productive. I find the notion that it is ethically sound 
to let healthy embryos die rather than use them to try to develop cell 
lines that could benefit sick and dying patients totally baffling. We talk 
about protecting human dignity. We should strive to help patients with 
serious illnesses that could potentially be treated with embryonic stem 
cells to live as fulfilling and dignified lives as is humanly possible. The 
research proposed in this White Paper largely fails to achieve this good, 
and thus I cannot support proposals I, II and III.  
 
 










Personal Statement of Professor Sandel 
 
 
I share the goal of seeking ethically uncontroversial ways of 
pursuing embryonic stem cell research. In my view, the first proposal 
(deriving cells from dead embryos) and the fourth (somatic cell 
dedifferentiation) are ethically acceptable and worthy of further 
exploration. I find the third proposal (deriving cells from specially 
engineered biological artifacts) to be morally objectionable. 
 
As one who supports embryonic stem cell research, I do not regard 
the early embryo as inviolable. But neither do I regard it as disposable, 
open to any use we may desire or devise. For this reason, embryo 
research carries a special moral burden; it is justified only for the sake 
of saving human lives or curing devastating diseases. The proposal to 
genetically engineer a nonviable, embryo-like being would remove the 
moral burden by creating something that, lacking the capacity to 
develop into a human person, would be wholly disposable, 
presumably for any purpose, weighty or trivial. The very project of 
creating such a being is morally troubling, for reasons that are well-
stated in the ethical analysis (pp. 38-45 above). I therefore do not 
believe that this proposal should be encouraged or endorsed. 
 
 














Adult stem cell: An undifferentiated cell found in a differentiated 
tissue that can renew itself and (with certain limitations) differentiate to 
yield all the specialized cell types of the tissue from which it originated. 
(NIH) 
 
Altered Nuclear Transfer (ANT): A proposed method, using a 
modified form of somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT), of producing a 
biological artifact from which human pluripotent stem cells could be 
derived. 
 
Anencephalic fetus: A fetus with a congenital defect related to 
development of the brain, with absence of the bones of the cranial vault 
and absent or rudimentary cerebral and cerebellar hemispheres, 
brainstem, and basal ganglia. (SMD) 
 
Aneuploid: Having an abnormal number of chromosomes. (SMD) 
 
Autologous: Derived or transferred from the same individual’s body. 
  
Biological artifact: As employed here, this phrase denotes an 
artificially created non-embryonic but embryo-like cellular system, 
engineered to lack the essential elements of embryogenesis but still 
capable of some cell division and growth. 
                                                 
* Definitions marked “(CR)” are from the Council’s report on human cloning 
(Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry, Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2002). Definitions marked “(NIH)” are from the 
National Institutes of Health online stem cell glossary at 
http://stemcells.nih.gov (accessed April 1, 2005). Definitions marked “(NRC)” 
are from the National Research Council report, Stem Cell Research and the Future 
of Regenerative Medicine (Washington, D.C.: National Research Council, 2001). 
Definitions marked “(SMD)” are from Stedman’s Medical Dictionary. 
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Biopsy: Process of removing tissue from patients for diagnostic 
examination. (SMD) 
 
Blastocyst: In mammals, an early stage of embryonic development at 
which the embryo (roughly 100-200 cells) is a hollow sphere made up 
of an outer layer of cells (the trophectoderm), a fluid-filled cavity (the 
blastocoel), and a cluster of cells on the interior (the inner cell mass).  
 
Blastomere: A cell contained within an early embryo (up to two days 
after conception, at which point the embryo comprises about 8 
blastomeres). 
 
Blastomere biopsy: Removal of one or two blastomeres from the 
embryo in vitro at about the 8-cell stage, usually in order to perform 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis and screening. 
 
Blastula: An early stage of embryonic development (roughly 100-200 
cells) at which the cells of the morula are rearranged to form a hollow 
sphere; at this stage of embryonic development in humans and other 
mammals, the embryo is generally called a blastocyst.   
 
Bone marrow: The soft, fatty, vascular tissue that fills most bone 
cavities and is the source of red blood cells and many white blood cells. 
 
Chimera: In experimental embryology, the individual produced by 
grafting an embryonic part of one animal on to the embryo of another, 
either of the same or of another species. (SMD) 
 
Chromosomes: Structures inside the nucleus of a cell, made up of long 
pieces of DNA coated with specialized cell proteins, which are 
duplicated at each mitotic cell division. Chromosomes thus transmit 
the genes of the organism from one generation to the next. (CR) 
 
Cleavage arrest: Spontaneous cessation of cell division in an early 
embryo. 
 
Cloned embryo: An embryo arising from the somatic cell nuclear 
transfer process as contrasted with an embryo arising from the union of 








Cloning-to-produce-children—Production of a cloned human embryo, 
formed for the (proximate) purpose of initiating a pregnancy, with the 
(ultimate) goal of producing a child who will be genetically virtually 
identical to a currently existing or previously existing individual. 
 
Cloning-for-biomedical-research—Production of a cloned human embryo, 
formed for the (proximate) purpose of using it in research or for 
extracting its stem cells, with the (ultimate) goals of gaining scientific 
knowledge of normal and abnormal development and of developing 
cures for human diseases. 
 
Human cloning—The asexual reproduction of a new human organism 
that is, at all stages of development, genetically virtually identical to a 
currently existing, or previously existing, human being. (CR) 
 
Cord blood: Blood in the umbilical cord and placenta. 
 
Cryopreservation and Cryostorage: Freezing of IVF embryos for later 
use. 
 
Cytoplasmic: Of or pertaining to the substance of a cell, exclusive of 
the nucleus. (SMD) 
 
Dedifferentiation: A procedure whereby differentiated, somatic cells 
are restored to a more undifferentiated, multipotent condition. 
 
Diploid: Refers to the full complement of chromosomes in a somatic 
cell, distinct for each species (forty-six in human beings). (CR)  
 
Embryo: (a) In humans, the developing organism from the time of 
fertilization until the end of the eighth week of gestation, when it 
becomes known as a fetus. (NIH) (b) The developing organism from 
the time of fertilization until significant differentiation has occurred, 
when the organism becomes known as a fetus. An organism in the 
early stages of development. (CR) 
 
Embryogenesis: That phase of prenatal development involved in 
establishment of the characteristic configuration of the body of the 
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embryo; in humans, embryogenesis is usually regarded as extending 
from the end of the second week to the end of the eighth week, after 
which the product of conception is usually spoken of as a fetus. (Based 
on SMD) 
 
Embryonic germ layers: The three initial tissue layers arising in the 
embryo—endoderm, mesoderm, and ectoderm—from which all other 
somatic tissue-types develop. (NRC) 
 
Embryonic stem cells (ESCs): Primitive (undifferentiated) cells, 
derived from the inner cell mass of the embryo, that have the potential 
to become a wide variety of specialized cell types. (Based on NIH) 
 
Enucleated oocyte: An egg cell from which the nucleus has been 
surgically removed. 
 
Ex vivo: Outside the body, frequently the equivalent of “in vitro”; the 
opposite of “in vivo.” 
 
Fertilization: The process whereby male and female gametes unite. 
(NIH) 
 
Fetus: A developing human from usually two months after conception 
to birth. (NIH) 
 
Gamete: A reproductive cell (egg or sperm). (CR) 
 
Gene: A functional unit of heredity that is a segment of DNA located in 
a specific site on a chromosome. A gene directs the formation of an 
enzyme or other protein. (NIH) 
 
Genome: The total gene complement of a set of chromosomes. (SMD) 
 
Genotype: The genetic constitution of an organism or a group of 
organisms. (SMD) 
 
Hydatidiform mole: An abnormality during pregnancy; a tissue mass 
or growth that forms within the uterus as the result of a genetic error 






Implantation: The attachment of the blastocyst to the lining of the 
uterus, and its subsequent embedding there. (Based on SMD) 
 
In vitro fertilization (IVF): The union of an egg and sperm, where the 
event takes place outside the body and in an artificial environment (the 
literal meaning of “in vitro” is “in glass”; for example, in a test tube). 
(CR) 
 
Inner cell mass: The cluster of cells inside the blastocyst. These cells 
give rise to the embryonic disk of the later embryo and, ultimately, the 
fetus. (NIH) 
 
IVF embryo: An embryo produced by in vitro fertilization.  
 
Karyotype: The chromosome characteristics (number, shape, etc.) of an 
individual cell or cell line, usually presented as a systematized array in 
pairs. (SMD) 
 
Lineage: The descendants of a common ancestor.  
 
Mesenchymal stem cells: Cells from the immature embryonic 
connective tissue. A number of cell types come from mesenchymal 
stem cells, including chondrocytes, which produce cartilage. (NIH) 
 
Morphology: Configuration or structure, shape. 
 
Morula: An early stage of embryonic development (roughly 16-64 cells) 
at which the embryo is a solid spherical mass of cells, resulting from 
the early cleavage divisions of the zygote; so called because of its 
resemblance to a “little mulberry” (in Latin, morula).  
 
Mosaic: Possessing two or more genetically different cell types; an 
early embryo is said to be mosaic when some of its cells exhibit 
chromosomal abnormalities while others appear chromosomally 
normal. 
 
Multipotent adult progenitor cells (MAPCs): Cells isolated from bone 
marrow that can be differentiated into cells with characteristics of 
cartilage, fat, and bone. 
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Multipotent cell: A cell that can produce two or more different types of 
differentiated cells; adult stem cells are multipotent. 
 
Oocyte: Unfertilized egg cell. 
 
Organismic death (of an embryo)—concept and criterion: As 
proposed by Landry and Zucker, the concept of organismic death for an 
early-stage human embryo is defined by irreversible loss of “the 
capacity for continued and integrated cellular division, growth, and 
differentiation”; their proposed criterion for determining organismic 
death is “irreversible cessation of cell division in the embryo observed 
in vitro.” 
 
Parthenogenesis: A form of reproduction in which an unfertilized egg 
develops into a new individual (SMD); the process of inducing an 
unfertilized egg to initiate cell division. 
 
Parthenote: The primary product of parthenogenesis; more precisely, 
an unfertilized egg that has been activated to initiate cell division. 
 
Placenta: The oval or discoid spongy structure in the uterus from 
which the fetus derives it nourishment and oxygen. (NRC) 
 
Pluripotent cell: A cell that can produce all the cell types of the 
developing body; embryonic stem cells, as well as the inner cell mass 
cells of the blastocyst, are pluripotent.  
 
Pluripotent stem cell: Any stem cell that has the same functional 
capacity—that is, stable pluripotency—as an embryonic stem cell, 
though not necessarily the same origin. 
 
Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD): A method of testing IVF 
embryos for chromosomal or genetic disorders before they are 
transferred to the uterus; typically one or two blastomeres are removed 
for genetic testing at about the 8-cell stage of embryonic development. 
 








Somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT): A method of cloning: transfer of 
the nucleus from a donor somatic cell into an enucleated oocyte to 
produce a cloned embryo. 
 
Stem cells: Stem cells are undifferentiated multipotent precursor cells 
that are capable both of perpetuating themselves as stem cells and of 
undergoing differentiation into one or more specialized types of cells. 
(CR) 
 
Stem cell line: Stem cells which have been cultured under in vitro 
conditions that allow proliferation without differentiation for months 
to years. (NIH) 
 
Superovulation: Drug-induced stimulation of a woman’s ovaries to 
produce many mature oocytes in a single menstrual cycle. 
 
Teratoma: A tumor consisting of different types of tissue, as of skin, 
hair, and muscle, caused by the development of independent germ 
cells. (SMD) 
 
Totipotent cell: A cell that can give rise to the entire organism, 
including the extra-embryonic membranes; the fertilized egg or zygote 
is totipotent. 
 
Trophectoderm: In early embryos at the blastocyst stage, the outer 
layer of cells that will give rise to the placenta. 
 
Uterine transfer: Transfer of an IVF embryo to a woman’s uterus with 
a view to implantation and gestation. 
 
Xenotransplantation: A transplant of tissue from an animal of one 
species to an animal of another species. 
 
Zygote: The diploid cell that results from the fertilization of an egg cell 
by a sperm cell. (CR) 
